Concurrent sentencing discretion under criminal procedure law applied only to substantive imprisonment, not fine or default sentences.

Section 427(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 confers a judicial discretion to direct a subsequent sentence to run concurrently with an earlier sentence, rather than applying the normal rule of consecutive operation. Applying that discretion to offences committed on the same day and considering the limited duration of the substantive imprisonment, the Court treated concurrency as appropriate for the substantive terms in the four later cases. The fine sentences and default sentences were left untouched and were not ordered to run concurrently, preserving their separate operation.

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Issues: Whether the sentences imposed in the four later cases should run concurrently with the sentence already being undergone by the appellant, and whether the fine sentences and default sentences should also be made concurrent.

Analysis: Section 427(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 permits a court to direct a subsequent sentence to run concurrently with a previous sentence, though the normal rule is consecutive operation. The discretion must be exercised judicially having regard to the nature of the offences and the fact situation. The crimes in question were committed on the same day, the substantive sentences were of limited duration, and the Court found it appropriate to extend concurrency for the substantive terms while preserving the separate character of the fine and default sentences.

Conclusion: The substantive sentences in the four cases were directed to run concurrently with the sentence already operative, but the fine sentences and default sentences were left intact and were not made concurrent.

Final Conclusion: The appellant obtained limited relief on sentence by securing concurrency only for the substantive terms, with the conviction and monetary/default consequences remaining unaffected.

Ratio Decidendi: Under Section 427(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the power to direct concurrent running of sentences is discretionary and must be exercised judicially on the facts of each case, while such relief may be confined to substantive imprisonment and need not extend to fine or default sentences.

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