Just a moment...
Press 'Enter' to add multiple search terms. Rules for Better Search
Use comma for multiple locations.
---------------- For section wise search only -----------------
Accuracy Level ~ 90%
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
No Folders have been created
Are you sure you want to delete "My most important" ?
NOTE:
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Don't have an account? Register Here
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Issues: Whether the summoning order and criminal proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 were liable to be quashed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 on the ground that the complaint did not mention the date of service of notice and was allegedly premature.
Analysis: The absence of the date of service of notice in the complaint did not, by itself, justify quashing at the inherent jurisdiction stage. The question whether the complaint was premature depended on factual matters that were open to examination by the trial court. At this stage, only a prima facie case was to be seen, and disputed defences of the accused could not be adjudicated in proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The applicant was left at liberty to raise such pleas before the trial court in appropriate proceedings.
Conclusion: The request to quash the summoning order and proceedings was rejected, and the challenge failed.
Final Conclusion: The criminal proceedings were permitted to continue, while limited interim protection was granted for a short period to enable the applicant to appear and seek bail before the trial court.
Ratio Decidendi: Inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 cannot be used to quash proceedings on the basis of disputed factual defences when a prima facie offence is disclosed.