Interim deposit in cheque dishonour cases may stand where no defence is disclosed and no failure of justice is shown.

Interim deposit orders in cheque dishonour proceedings under Section 143-A of the Negotiable Instruments Act are treated as discretionary measures that need not be disturbed under inherent jurisdiction where the accused has not disclosed a defence or produced rebuttal material. The note also records that a trial court may invoke Section 143-A without a separate complainant's application, and a brief order is not invalid if the record shows application of mind and no failure of justice is demonstrated. The provision's built-in safeguards and refund mechanism address concerns about prejudice. On that basis, the challenge to the deposit direction was rejected and the proceedings were allowed to continue.

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Issues: (i) Whether the trial court's order directing deposit of 20% of the cheque amount under Section 143-A of the Negotiable Instruments Act warranted interference in exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. (ii) Whether the absence of a specific application by the complainant and the alleged cryptic nature of the order invalidated the trial court's exercise of power under Section 143-A of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Issue (i): Whether the trial court's order directing deposit of 20% of the cheque amount under Section 143-A of the Negotiable Instruments Act warranted interference in exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Analysis: The complaint had already resulted in cognizance of the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, issuance of summons, appearance of the accused, grant of bail, and recording of plea. The accused had not disclosed any defence before the trial court or placed any material to rebut the presumption arising under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. In these circumstances, the discretionary order under Section 143-A could not be characterised as erroneous, arbitrary, or an abuse of process. The scope of interference under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was therefore not attracted.

Conclusion: The order directing deposit of 20% of the cheque amount did not call for interference, and the challenge failed.

Issue (ii): Whether the absence of a specific application by the complainant and the alleged cryptic nature of the order invalidated the trial court's exercise of power under Section 143-A of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Analysis: The provision was held to be capable of being invoked by the trial court on its own in the circumstances of the case, and not only on a formal application by the complainant. The absence of detailed reasons did not justify interference because the surrounding record showed application of mind, there was no demonstrated defence by the accused, and no failure of justice was shown within the meaning of Section 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The apprehension regarding refund was also treated as sufficiently addressable by the safeguards in Section 143-A itself and by appropriate directions.

Conclusion: The order was not invalid for want of a complainant's application or for being cryptic.

Final Conclusion: The petition was dismissed, the impugned order under Section 143-A was upheld, and the trial court's proceedings were left to continue with the deposit and further directions in place.

Ratio Decidendi: A discretionary order under Section 143-A of the Negotiable Instruments Act directing interim deposit in a cheque dishonour case is not liable to be interfered with under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in the absence of a disclosed defence, rebuttal material, or demonstrated failure of justice, and the provision may be invoked by the trial court even without a separate application by the complainant.

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