Contempt jurisdiction and fair criticism: constitutional contempt power remains plenary, while scandalous allegations against judges may still amount to contempt.

The article explains that the Supreme Court's contempt power as a constitutional court of record is plenary and is not curtailed by the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which operates as a procedural framework rather than the source of jurisdiction. It further notes that suo motu contempt can be initiated on information before the Court without consent of the Attorney General or Solicitor General, and that brief notice with later supply of annexures may be sufficient if no prejudice is caused. It also states that scandalous allegations imputing mala fides, bias, corruption, or attacks on judicial integrity can amount to criminal contempt, while fair criticism and unsubstantiated truth defences do not protect such conduct.

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Issues: (i) Whether the Supreme Court's contempt jurisdiction under the Constitution is curtailed by the procedure in the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and the Rules to Regulate Proceedings for Contempt of the Supreme Court, 1975. (ii) Whether the notice of contempt and the initiation of proceedings were validly issued as suo motu proceedings. (iii) Whether the contents of the two complaints amounted to criminal contempt and whether the defence of truth or criticism protected the contemnors.

Issue (i): Whether the Supreme Court's contempt jurisdiction under the Constitution is curtailed by the procedure in the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and the Rules to Regulate Proceedings for Contempt of the Supreme Court, 1975.

Analysis: The constitutional power of the Supreme Court as a court of record to punish for contempt of itself was treated as plenary and not abridged by statute. The statutory scheme was read as providing procedure for initiation and regulation, but not as the source of the Court's contempt power. The judgment distinguished between the Court's inherent constitutional jurisdiction and the procedural requirements contained in the statute and the Rules.

Conclusion: The objection that the proceedings failed for want of strict compliance with the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 was rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether the notice of contempt and the initiation of proceedings were validly issued as suo motu proceedings.

Analysis: The Court treated the reference material placed before it as information that enabled the Court itself to take cognizance. It held that suo motu contempt does not require consent of the Attorney General or Solicitor General. It also held that the notice satisfied the governing form because only a brief description of the contempt was required, and the subsequent supply of annexures removed any prejudice. The proceedings were not treated as a private complaint but as action taken by the Court on its own motion.

Conclusion: The notice and initiation of the contempt case were held to be valid and the discharge applications were rejected.

Issue (iii): Whether the contents of the two complaints amounted to criminal contempt and whether the defence of truth or criticism protected the contemnors.

Analysis: The Court found that the complaints contained scurrilous, scandalous, and intemperate allegations against sitting Judges, including imputations of mala fides, bias, incompetence, corruption, and abuse of power. It held that fair criticism of judicial orders is permissible, but attribution of motives, attacks on integrity, and language calculated to lower the authority of the Court cross the line into contempt. The plea of truth failed because no material was shown to substantiate the allegations.

Conclusion: All three alleged contemnors were held guilty of contempt of court.

Final Conclusion: The contempt jurisdiction was upheld, the procedural objections were rejected, and the contemnors were found guilty, with the matter kept pending for hearing on sentence.

Ratio Decidendi: The Supreme Court's constitutional power to punish for contempt of itself is not curtailed by the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and fair criticism does not protect scandalous allegations imputing mala fides or attacking the integrity and impartiality of Judges.

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