Limitation for refund claims runs from communication of the order, not mere pronouncement, where the assessee must know the order to act.

For an assessee seeking a statutory refund remedy under the Customs Act, limitation was treated as running from the date the order was communicated or otherwise made known, because effective knowledge of the order is necessary to pursue the remedy. The date of mere pronouncement or signing was held not to be the operative date for reckoning limitation. Applying that principle, the rejection of the refund claim on limitation was set aside and the appeal succeeded.

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Issues: Whether the limitation period for filing a refund claim under the Customs Act runs from the date of pronouncement of the order or from the date on which the order is communicated to the assessee.

Analysis: The refund claim was required to be filed within the prescribed period from the date of the order. The decisive question was whether, for the assessee, the relevant date is the date when the order was signed or pronounced, or the date when it was communicated so that the assessee could know its contents and seek the remedy. Applying the principle that knowledge of the order is an essential element for the aggrieved party, the communication of the order was treated as the operative date for reckoning limitation.

Conclusion: The limitation period was held to run from the date of communication of the order to the assessee, not merely from the date of its pronouncement. The refund rejection on limitation was set aside and the appeal succeeded.

Ratio Decidendi: For an assessee seeking a statutory remedy, limitation runs from the date on which the order is communicated or otherwise made known, and not merely from the date on which it is pronounced or signed.

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