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Issues: (i) Whether the Explanation added to section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 shifted the burden of proof to the assessee in cases where returned income was less than 80 per cent of assessed income and displaced the earlier rule in Anwar Ali's case; (ii) whether the Tribunal was right in upholding the penalty for assessment year 1969-70 and cancelling the penalties for assessment years 1970-71 and 1971-72.
Issue (i): Whether the Explanation added to section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 shifted the burden of proof to the assessee in cases where returned income was less than 80 per cent of assessed income and displaced the earlier rule in Anwar Ali's case
Analysis: The amendment was held to be a deliberate change in the law. The omission of the word "deliberately" from clause (c) and the insertion of the Explanation created an objective test based on the comparison between returned income and assessed income. In cases falling within the Explanation, three rebuttable presumptions arise against the assessee: that the assessed income is the correct income, that failure to return it was due to fraud, and that it was due to gross or wilful neglect. The provision was treated as a rule of evidence operating in civil penalty proceedings, where rebuttal is by preponderance of evidence and may be shown from existing material on record. The earlier decision in Anwar Ali, based on section 28(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, was held no longer applicable to the amended provision.
Conclusion: The Explanation shifts the burden to the assessee in the specified class of cases, and the earlier view treating the department as bearing the burden throughout is incorrect.
Issue (ii): Whether the Tribunal was right in upholding the penalty for assessment year 1969-70 and cancelling the penalties for assessment years 1970-71 and 1971-72
Analysis: For assessment year 1969-70, the returned income was below 80 per cent of the assessed income, so the Explanation applied. The materials relied upon, including the statement of the name-lender and the assessee's own revised returns, were relevant and the assessee failed to rebut the presumptions raised by the Explanation. For assessment years 1970-71 and 1971-72, the revised returns were filed before completion of the assessments, and the Tribunal also accepted the assessee's technical objection regarding the forwarding of penalty proceedings. On that record, no basis was shown to disturb the Tribunal's cancellation of penalty for those two years.
Conclusion: The penalty for assessment year 1969-70 was rightly sustained, while the cancellation of penalties for assessment years 1970-71 and 1971-72 was also upheld.
Final Conclusion: The amended penalty provision was construed as creating a rebuttable evidentiary presumption against the assessee in qualifying cases, and the Tribunal's mixed result on the penalties was sustained.
Ratio Decidendi: Where returned income is less than 80 per cent of assessed income, the Explanation to section 271(1)(c) raises rebuttable presumptions against the assessee and shifts to the assessee the burden of disproving fraud or gross or wilful neglect by preponderance of evidence.