Special limitation provisions exclude general condonation powers where no express delay extension is provided.

An appeal under the Central Excise Act was governed by a special limitation provision that fixed the filing period without any express power to condone delay. In that setting, Section 5 of the Limitation Act was excluded, because the general condonation provision cannot be invoked where the special statute does not permit extension of time. The result was that delay could not be condoned and the appeal remained barred by limitation.

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Issues: Whether an appeal under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944 could be entertained by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for condonation of delay, or whether the remedy was barred by limitation due to complete exclusion of the Limitation Act.

Analysis: The appeal was filed under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944. Relying on the Supreme Court's interpretation of the statutory scheme, the Court held that the provision governing appeals to the High Court prescribes a fixed period of limitation and does not contain any enabling clause for condonation beyond that period. In the absence of such a provision, Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 stands excluded for appeals of this nature, and delay cannot be condoned by resort to the general limitation statute.

Conclusion: Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 was held inapplicable, and the appeal was barred by limitation.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the special statute governing an appeal to the High Court prescribes limitation without expressly permitting condonation of delay, the general power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is excluded.

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