Shared household under domestic violence law is broader than husband-owned property, and residence rights must be considered in civil proceedings.

Section 2(s) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 is not confined to a joint family house or property in which the husband has a share; it extends to a household lived in within a domestic relationship, including premises owned or tenanted by the respondent singly or jointly and joint family property. The earlier view in S.R. Batra v. Taruna Batra was held not to correctly state the law because it narrowed the statutory text and defeated the residence right. A decree on admission under Order XII Rule 6 CPC cannot ignore a pleaded statutory right of residence, since relief under Section 26 may be raised in civil proceedings. Pending or passed domestic violence orders do not bar a civil suit, though they are relevant and the husband may be a proper party.

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Issues: (i) Whether the definition of shared household under Section 2(s) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 is confined to a joint family house or a house in which the husband has a share; (ii) whether the earlier view in S.R. Batra v. Taruna Batra correctly states the law; (iii) whether the civil suit could be decreed on admission under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 without considering the defendant's pleaded right of residence under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005; (iv) what is the effect of pending or passed orders under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 on a civil suit and whether the husband was a necessary or proper party.

Issue (i): Whether the definition of shared household under Section 2(s) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 is confined to a joint family house or a house in which the husband has a share.

Analysis: The definition of shared household was read as an exhaustive definition, but not one restricted to property belonging to the husband or to joint family property in which the husband has a share. The Court held that the expression covers a household where the aggrieved person lives or has lived in a domestic relationship and also includes a household owned or tenanted by the respondent, singly or jointly, and a household belonging to the respondent's joint family. The focus is on the domestic relationship and the statutory right of residence, not on the husband's proprietary interest.

Conclusion: The definition is not confined to a joint family house or to a house in which the husband has a share; the wider statutory meaning applies.

Issue (ii): Whether the earlier view in S.R. Batra v. Taruna Batra correctly states the law.

Analysis: The Court held that the earlier interpretation unduly narrowed the statutory language and frustrated the object of the enactment. It found that the reasoning that a shared household must belong to or be taken on rent by the husband, or be joint family property of which the husband is a member, did not accord with the text and scheme of the Act. The Court concluded that the earlier view overlooked the full definition and the legislative intent to secure residence rights to women in domestic relationships.

Conclusion: The earlier view does not lay down the correct law.

Issue (iii): Whether the civil suit could be decreed on admission under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 without considering the defendant's pleaded right of residence under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

Analysis: Judgment on admission is discretionary and can be passed only on clear, unambiguous and unconditional admissions. The defendant's stand that the suit property was a shared household and that she had a right of residence raised a substantive defence that went to the root of the suit. The Court also held that reliefs under the domestic violence statute can be claimed in civil proceedings under Section 26, so the pleaded statutory right could not be ignored while deciding the suit on admission.

Conclusion: The suit could not be decreed under Order XII Rule 6 on the basis adopted by the Trial Court.

Issue (iv): What is the effect of pending or passed orders under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 on a civil suit and whether the husband was a necessary or proper party.

Analysis: The Court held that proceedings under the domestic violence statute and civil proceedings are independent, and a pending or passed order under the Act is relevant evidence but does not bar a civil court from deciding the dispute. The civil court must decide the issues on evidence, while giving due weight to the statutory orders. The husband was not a necessary party in every case, but in the present context he was a proper party because the claimed residence rights and alternate accommodation issues were interlinked with the matrimonial relationship.

Conclusion: Pending or passed domestic violence orders do not bar the civil suit, and the husband was a proper party though not a necessary party in the strict sense.

Final Conclusion: The statutory right of residence under the domestic violence law must be considered in civil proceedings, the restrictive earlier interpretation of shared household was disapproved, and the High Court's remand for fresh adjudication was upheld, resulting in dismissal of the appeal.

Ratio Decidendi: The right of residence under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 extends to a shared household as defined by statute, civil proceedings affecting that right remain maintainable and must be decided on evidence, and a decree on admission cannot be granted where the defendant raises a substantive statutory defence going to the root of the claim.

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