Inclusive definition of consumer extends to companies; delayed electricity supply can amount to deficiency in service under consumer law.

An inclusive definition of "person" under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 extends to a private limited company as a juristic person, so a company can qualify as a consumer. Supply of electricity by the Board falls within "service" because the statutory definition covers facilities connected with electrical energy, and delay in furnishing the agreed supply may constitute deficiency in service. On that basis, a complaint for delayed supply was maintainable under the Act, and the commercial purpose exclusion did not defeat consumer jurisdiction on the pre-amendment facts.

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Issues: (i) Whether a private limited company is a "person" and therefore a "consumer" within the meaning of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. (ii) Whether supply of electricity by the Board constitutes "service" and whether a complaint for delay in supply is maintainable under the Act.

Issue (i): Whether a private limited company is a "person" and therefore a "consumer" within the meaning of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

Analysis: The definition of "person" in Section 2(1)(m) is inclusive, not exhaustive. An inclusive definition is intended to enlarge the ordinary meaning of the expression and cannot be confined only to the categories expressly enumerated. The statutory context, including the wide remedial object of the Act and the inclusive definition of "person" in the General Clauses Act, supports inclusion of a company as a juristic person. The enumeration in Section 2(1)(m) does not exclude body corporates.

Conclusion: A private limited company is a "person" and can be a "consumer" under the Act.

Issue (ii): Whether supply of electricity by the Board constitutes "service" and whether a complaint for delay in supply is maintainable under the Act.

Analysis: Electricity supplied by the Board is not to be treated as a sale of goods for the purpose of excluding jurisdiction under the Act. The statutory definition of "service" expressly includes facilities in connection with supply of electrical energy, and delay in furnishing the agreed supply may amount to deficiency in service. The commercial purpose exclusion did not apply to the controversy because the dispute related to the pre-amendment position. The complaint therefore fell within the consumer jurisdiction.

Conclusion: Supply of electricity is covered by "service" and the complaint for delay in supply was maintainable.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to maintainability failed in respect of the complaint concerning delayed supply of electricity, while the connected dispute regarding tariff classification also succeeded for the complainant, resulting in a mixed outcome.

Ratio Decidendi: An inclusive statutory definition of "person" may extend to a company, and supply of electricity, where delayed beyond the agreed time, constitutes service capable of giving rise to deficiency under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

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