De facto guardian alienation requires proof of legal necessity; ignored material evidence can justify second-appeal interference.

An alienation by a de facto guardian is binding only where the transferee affirmatively proves legal necessity; on the facts, the alleged debts, marriage expenses and Sudhi ceremony expenditure were not established, so the sale was not binding on the plaintiff. The suit was also held not barred by limitation because Article 44 of the Limitation Act, 1908 applied to de jure guardian alienations, while a de facto guardian's sale attracted the longer limitation period. The first appellate court's failure to consider material admissions and the trial court's reasoning justified interference in second appeal, as such non-consideration undermined the finding under Section 100 CPC.

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Issues: (i) Whether the alienation by the de facto guardian was supported by legal necessity and binding on the plaintiff; (ii) whether the suit was barred by limitation under Article 44 of the Limitation Act, 1908; (iii) whether the High Court could interfere in second appeal with the first appellate court's findings when material evidence had been ignored.

Issue (i): Whether the alienation by the de facto guardian was supported by legal necessity and binding on the plaintiff;

Analysis: The alleged necessities were repayment of debt, marriage expenses, and expenses for the Sudhi ceremony. The evidence did not establish any pressing marriage expenses, as the marriage was in Tolakanva form and no negotiation for marriage existed at the time of sale. The claim regarding repayment of loan for the Sudhi ceremony also failed, since the evidence did not show that any loan had in fact been incurred or that the estate was liable to reimburse voluntary expenditure by near relations. The alleged creditor's loan was not satisfactorily proved, and the first appellate court failed to consider material admissions and the trial court's reasons. Legal necessity for supporting the alienation was therefore not established.

Conclusion: The alienation was not supported by legal necessity and was not binding on the plaintiff.

Issue (ii): Whether the suit was barred by limitation under Article 44 of the Limitation Act, 1908;

Analysis: The trial court had applied Article 44 on the footing that the alienation was not for legal necessity. However, the governing principle drawn from the authorities relied upon was that Article 44 applied to alienations by a de jure guardian, whereas a de facto guardian's alienation stood on a different footing and the enlarged period of limitation of 12 years applied. Once the sale deed was held to be by a de facto guardian and not binding for want of legal necessity, the trial court's limitation reasoning could not stand.

Conclusion: The suit was not barred by limitation.

Issue (iii): Whether the High Court could interfere in second appeal with the first appellate court's findings when material evidence had been ignored;

Analysis: The first appellate court, as the final court of fact, was required to examine the evidence independently and meet the trial court's reasoning, especially when reversing findings. Its failure to notice material admissions, to consider relevant evidence, and to deal with the trial court's analysis amounted to a serious infirmity. In such a situation, the bar under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not prevent interference, because the finding was not the product of a proper appraisal of the record.

Conclusion: Interference in second appeal was permissible on the facts of the case.

Final Conclusion: The plaintiff succeeded in establishing that the impugned sales did not bind her interest, and the decrees of the courts below were reversed with a decree for the suit and consequential reliefs.

Ratio Decidendi: An alienation by a de facto guardian is binding only if legal necessity is affirmatively proved by the transferee, and a first appellate finding based on material non-consideration of evidence is open to interference in second appeal.

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