Revisional interference at charge stage is unwarranted when a prima facie conspiracy and fraud are disclosed

At the charge stage, revisional interference is improper where the trial court has found a prima facie case of conspiracy and fraudulent sanction and encashment of loans; the charges should be restored and the trial allowed to proceed. The wider definition of "public servant" under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 may extend to office-bearers of a registered co-operative banking society where the statutory ingredients are satisfied, so such persons cannot be excluded at the threshold on the basis of the earlier narrower view. These observations were confined to the prima facie stage and not to the merits of the trial.

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Issues: (i) Whether the High Court was justified in revisional jurisdiction in quashing the charges framed by the Trial Court against the respondents. (ii) Whether the respondents, as office-bearers and members of the co-operative bank, fell within the definition of public servant under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

Issue (i): Whether the High Court was justified in revisional jurisdiction in quashing the charges framed by the Trial Court against the respondents.

Analysis: The Trial Court had found a prima facie case and directed framing of charges. In revision, the High Court reassessed the factual material and concluded that the respondents, being members of the Loan Committee, had only a limited role and that the borrowers had repaid the loans, thereby treating the matter as lacking criminality. The revisional court, however, was not entitled to convert the scrutiny at the charge stage into a detailed appreciation of evidence. Where the material disclosed allegations of conspiracy and fraudulent sanction and encashment of loans, the proper course was to permit the trial to proceed.

Conclusion: The High Court was not justified in quashing the charges; the Trial Court's order framing charges was liable to be restored.

Issue (ii): Whether the respondents, as office-bearers and members of the co-operative bank, fell within the definition of public servant under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

Analysis: The earlier narrower understanding of public servant under the repealed anti-corruption regime was inapplicable because Section 2(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 contains a wider definition. A registered co-operative society engaged in banking, and its office-bearers, can fall within that definition where the statutory ingredients are satisfied. The High Court's reliance on the older position was therefore misplaced. The existence of remedies under the M.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 did not bar resort to the general criminal law where allegations under the Penal Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act were made out at the prima facie stage.

Conclusion: The respondents could not be excluded, at the threshold, from the ambit of public servant under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

Final Conclusion: The appeals succeeded, the revisional order of the High Court was set aside, the charges framed by the Trial Court were restored, and the trial was directed to proceed. The observations were confined to the prima facie stage and were not to affect the merits of the trial.

Ratio Decidendi: At the stage of framing of charge, revisional interference is unwarranted where the material discloses a prima facie case of conspiracy and fraudulent conduct, and the wider definition of public servant under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 may apply to office-bearers of a registered co-operative banking society.

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