Adulteration and probation principles applied: prohibited colouring matter sustained conviction, but sentence was replaced with probation.

A prohibited coal-tar dye in food was treated as adulteration under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act because Rules 23 and 28 banned its use altogether; to avoid an absurd result, the Court read the word "and" in Section 2(i)(j) disjunctively as "or", and the conviction under Sections 7 and 16(1)(a)(i) was sustainable. On sentence, the Court found the case fit for probation despite the statutory minimum, considering the accused's age, the limited nature of the offence, and the special circumstances, so the conviction was not disturbed on merits but the custodial sentence was replaced by release on probation under Section 4(1) of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.

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Issues: (i) Whether the use of a colouring matter prohibited by the Food Adulteration Rules amounted to adulteration under Section 2(i)(j) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 by reading the word "and" as "or"; and (ii) whether the accused was entitled to the benefit of Section 4(1) of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.

Issue (i): Whether the use of a colouring matter prohibited by the Food Adulteration Rules amounted to adulteration under Section 2(i)(j) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 by reading the word "and" as "or".

Analysis: The article contained metanil yellow, a coal-tar dye not permitted by the relevant rules. The Court held that Rules 23 and 28 prohibited its use altogether, so the first part of Section 2(i)(j) was satisfied. A literal reading of "and" would produce an absurd result, because a completely prohibited colouring matter cannot sensibly be tested against a limit of variability. Applying the principle that a penal provision may be construed to avoid absurdity, the Court read "and" disjunctively as "or".

Conclusion: The act constituted adulteration under Section 2(i)(j), and the conviction under Section 16(1)(a)(i) read with Section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 was sustainable.

Issue (ii): Whether the accused was entitled to the benefit of Section 4(1) of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.

Analysis: The sentence imposed was the statutory minimum, but the Court took note of the accused's age, the limited nature of the offence, and the special circumstances of the case. On that basis, the Court considered the case fit for probation notwithstanding the conviction.

Conclusion: The conviction and sentence were set aside and the accused was directed to be released on probation under Section 4(1) of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.

Final Conclusion: The revision succeeded in substance: the finding of guilt was not disturbed on merits, but the custodial sentence was replaced by probationary release on bond.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a provision would otherwise yield an absurd result, a penal statute may be construed by reading conjunctive words disjunctively to give effect to the legislative intent, and probation may be granted in a fit case despite a minimum sentence where the governing probation law so permits.

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