Tribunal jurisdiction over withdrawal of bank complaint letters stayed where statutory power appeared confined to Section 17 adjudication

The Tribunal's power under the 1993 Act was questioned where it directed that a bank's complaint letter be treated as withdrawn, because that relief was viewed as a final order on a matter arguably outside the adjudicatory field under Section 17. Prima facie, Section 19(25) was not read as extending jurisdiction to grant relief beyond the statutory scope of adjudication, and the prior disposal of the deletion and cancellation application strengthened the jurisdictional objection. The appellate affirmation was said to have overlooked that objection, so the bank was found to have an arguable case and the withdrawal direction was stayed for three weeks.

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Issues: Whether the Debts Recovery Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal could, in proceedings under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, direct that the bank's complaint letter be treated as withdrawn, and whether that direction deserved interim interference.

Analysis: The Tribunal's authority was noted to be derived from the statute, and the order treating the complaint letter as withdrawn was viewed as a final relief on a matter not falling squarely within the adjudicatory field under Section 17. It was held, prima facie, that Section 19(25) could not be read as conferring power to decide matters beyond the scope of adjudication under Section 17. The application seeking deletion and cancellation of the complaint letter had already been disposed of, and the tribunal's authority to grant such relief was therefore treated as a serious jurisdictional question. On that basis, the appellate affirmation was considered to have overlooked the jurisdictional objection raised by the bank.

Conclusion: The bank made out an arguable case, and the direction treating the complaint letter dated February 2, 2016 as withdrawn, as upheld in appeal, was stayed for three weeks.

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