Summons to produce documents cannot compel a non-party to testify on oath; such orders may also escape the interlocutory bar.

A summons to produce a document does not, by itself, make the recipient a witness or authorise examination on oath; the court may require production, but not compel a non-party to attend, answer questions, or submit to cross-examination merely to locate the document. Where production is unlikely, the Code provided search powers rather than witness-style interrogation. An order directing such attendance and oath-bound questioning was therefore without authority. The revisional challenge was also maintainable because an order conclusively affecting a non-party is not necessarily interlocutory for Section 397 CrPC purposes, and the bar on revision did not apply against the appellant.

---

---

Issues: (i) Whether a person, not being a party to the enquiry or trial, could be compelled under a summons to produce documents to attend court, make a statement on oath, and submit to questioning merely to satisfy the court about the whereabouts of the document. (ii) Whether the Magistrate's order directing such attendance and the revisional challenge to it were barred as an interlocutory order under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Issue (i): Whether a person, not being a party to the enquiry or trial, could be compelled under a summons to produce documents to attend court, make a statement on oath, and submit to questioning merely to satisfy the court about the whereabouts of the document.

Analysis: Section 94 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 authorises a summons to attend and produce a document, or to cause it to be produced, but it does not convert the addressee into a witness merely because the document is sought from that person. Section 139 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 likewise shows that production of a document does not, by itself, make the person a witness liable to cross-examination. If the court had reason to believe that the document would not be produced, it could resort to search under Section 96 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and, where the statutory conditions were met, a search of the house under Section 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. There was no provision enabling the court to require an oath-bound statement or to question the appellant as if she were a witness.

Conclusion: The direction requiring the appellant to attend court and answer on oath was without authority of law and could not stand.

Issue (ii): Whether the Magistrate's order directing such attendance and the revisional challenge to it were barred as an interlocutory order under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Analysis: An interlocutory order is generally an intermediate order made during the progress of an inquiry or trial, but the expression must be understood with reference to the purpose of the provision. An order may be interlocutory as between the parties to the proceeding, yet final insofar as it conclusively affects a person who is not a party and has no effective opportunity to challenge it later. The impugned order was directed solely against the appellant, who was not a party to the criminal case, and the adverse effect on her rights could not be redressed by waiting for the final decision in the prosecution.

Conclusion: The order was not interlocutory as against the appellant, and the revision was not barred by Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded because the Magistrate had no power to compel the appellant to attend and be examined on oath for production of the document, and the revisional courts wrongly treated the challenge as barred by the interlocutory-order rule.

Ratio Decidendi: A summons to produce a document does not, without more, make the recipient a witness or permit examination on oath, and an order conclusively affecting a non-party may fall outside the interlocutory-order bar to revisional jurisdiction.

---