Conviction for moral turpitude can bar chartered accountant registration even if the offence occurred before enrolment, with notice and hearing required.

A conviction for an offence involving moral turpitude was treated as a statutory disqualification under the Chartered Accountants Act, even though the offence pre-dated enrolment, because the focus is on the conviction and the nature of the offence rather than when the conduct occurred. The provision was read as a bar to both entry on and continued retention in the register, subject only to any pardon. Proceedings based on that disqualification were held distinct from professional misconduct proceedings, so a prior disciplinary inquiry was not required before removal action could proceed, although notice and a hearing remained necessary.

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Issues: (i) Whether conviction for an offence involving moral turpitude, though the offence occurred before enrolment as a chartered accountant, attracted the disability under Section 8(v) of the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949. (ii) Whether such action required prior disciplinary inquiry under Section 21 of the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949 before the ICAI could proceed to remove the member from the register.

Issue (i): Whether conviction for an offence involving moral turpitude, though the offence occurred before enrolment as a chartered accountant, attracted the disability under Section 8(v) of the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949.

Analysis: Section 8(v) was construed as creating a separate and graver disability from professional misconduct. The expression "entered in or borne on the Register" was read to mean that the statutory bar applies both at the stage of entry and while continuing on the register. The Court held that the provision is not confined to offences committed in a professional capacity where the conviction is for an offence involving moral turpitude; such conviction is a complete disqualification unless a pardon is granted. The prior timing of the incident did not save the petitioner, because the statutory focus is the conviction and the nature of the offence, not the date of enrolment.

Conclusion: The disability under Section 8(v) applied to the petitioner and the ICAI was entitled to proceed on that basis.

Issue (ii): Whether such action required prior disciplinary inquiry under Section 21 of the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949 before the ICAI could proceed to remove the member from the register.

Analysis: The Court distinguished proceedings for professional or other misconduct under Sections 21 and 22 from a removal action founded on conviction for moral turpitude under Section 8(v). It held that cases falling under Section 8(v) do not require the matter to be routed through the Board of Discipline or the Disciplinary Committee, though fairness and natural justice still require notice and a hearing. The impugned notice of hearing was therefore not without jurisdiction merely because a Section 21 inquiry had not been initiated.

Conclusion: Prior disciplinary inquiry under Section 21 was not a precondition for proceedings based on Section 8(v), though a fair hearing had to be given.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition challenging the show cause and hearing notice failed, and the ICAI's proceedings were sustained, with liberty to the petitioner to respond before the Council.

Ratio Decidendi: A conviction for an offence involving moral turpitude disqualifies a person from being entered in or continuing on the register of chartered accountants under Section 8(v) even if the offence pre-dated enrolment, and such action need not be preceded by a Section 21 disciplinary inquiry, though natural justice must be observed.

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