Professional misconduct extends to liquidation work, and disciplinary power reaches conduct making a member unfit to remain enrolled.

A chartered accountant acting as a liquidator was treated as being in practice because the statutory definition of practice extended to services contemplated by regulation, including liquidation work. Misconduct in that capacity was therefore professional misconduct. The disciplinary provisions were not confined to the traditional, enumerated forms of misconduct; the statute also reached conduct that rendered a member unfit to remain in the Institute. On reference, the High Court had wide power to test the legal basis of the Council's finding and make an appropriate order or remit the matter. The result discussed was that removal from the register was justified.

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Issues: (i) Whether a chartered accountant acting as a liquidator under an appointment made through court process was acting in practice within the meaning of the Act, so that misconduct in that capacity could amount to professional misconduct; (ii) Whether the disciplinary jurisdiction under sections 21 and 22 was confined to misconduct strictly connected with the traditional exercise of the profession or extended to conduct rendering a member unfit to be a member of the Institute even if not specifically enumerated in the Schedule; (iii) Whether the High Court, on reference under section 21, could grant appropriate relief even though the Council's finding was framed in narrower terms.

Issue (i): Whether a chartered accountant acting as a liquidator under an appointment made through court process was acting in practice within the meaning of the Act, so that misconduct in that capacity could amount to professional misconduct.

Analysis: The expression "to be in practice" was given an extended meaning by section 2(2)(iv), which covered services which, in the opinion of the Council, may be rendered by a chartered accountant. Regulation 78 specifically contemplated work as liquidator, and the respondent's appointment and conduct as liquidator therefore fell within the statutory notion of practice. Once a member was deemed to be in practice in that capacity, acts and omissions in the discharge of that role were attributable to him as professional conduct.

Conclusion: Yes. The respondent's conduct as liquidator was professional conduct within the Act and constituted professional misconduct.

Issue (ii): Whether the disciplinary jurisdiction under sections 21 and 22 was confined to misconduct strictly connected with the traditional exercise of the profession or extended to conduct rendering a member unfit to be a member of the Institute even if not specifically enumerated in the Schedule.

Analysis: Section 21(1) empowered inquiry where the Council formed the opinion that proved conduct would render a member unfit to be a member of the Institute. Section 22 was inclusive, not exhaustive, and its saving language preserved the wider power under section 21(1). The Schedule did not exhaust the field of misconduct, and the disciplinary power was not restricted to cases falling within the narrow catalogue of enumerated acts and omissions.

Conclusion: No. The disciplinary jurisdiction was not so confined; it extended to other conduct rendering a member unfit to remain on the roll.

Issue (iii): Whether the High Court, on reference under section 21, could grant appropriate relief even though the Council's finding was framed in narrower terms.

Analysis: Under section 21(3), the High Court was authorised to pass such final orders as it thought fit or to remit the matter for further inquiry. The Court held that this power was wide enough to examine the correctness of the finding, adopt the proper legal construction, and, where necessary, send the matter back or make an appropriate order on the facts proved. The narrow framing of the Council's finding did not preclude the High Court from acting on the correct legal basis.

Conclusion: Yes. The High Court had ample power to make an appropriate order on the proper legal footing.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded, the respondent was held guilty of professional misconduct, and the disciplinary consequence of removal from the register was warranted.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the governing statute gives an inclusive definition of misconduct and extends the notion of practice to specified ancillary services, misconduct committed in the discharge of such services is professional misconduct and may justify disciplinary action if it renders the member unfit to remain in the profession.

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