Khas possession under land reform law requires actual intermediary possession; a mere right to recover land from tenants-at-will is insufficient.

Section 6 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 saves only land in the intermediary's khas possession on the date of vesting, meaning actual possession or cultivation by the intermediary or through servants, hired labour, or hired stock. Land actually held by tenants-at-will does not qualify, because a tenant-at-will has a lawful possessory right until tenancy is validly terminated and is not the landlord's possession. A mere right to recover possession is therefore insufficient to constitute khas possession. The text also notes that an alleged settlement raised during the proceedings and an objection based on an earlier procedural order did not provide a basis to disturb the High Court's decision.

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Issues: (i) Whether land in the actual possession of tenants-at-will on the date of vesting could be treated as being in the intermediary's khas possession within the meaning of Section 6 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950; (ii) Whether the intermediary's mere right to take possession from a tenant-at-will amounted to khas possession for the purpose of Section 6; (iii) Whether the appellant could rely on the alleged settlement said to have been made during the pendency of the proceedings or on the High Court's earlier procedural order to sustain the appeal.

Issue (i): Whether land in the actual possession of tenants-at-will on the date of vesting could be treated as being in the intermediary's khas possession within the meaning of Section 6 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950.

Analysis: The statutory scheme vested the estate in the State on notification under Section 3, and Section 4 operated to divest the intermediary except for interests expressly saved. Section 6 saved only lands which were in the intermediary's khas possession on the date of vesting. The definition of khas possession in Section 2(k) required actual cultivation by the proprietor or tenure-holder himself, or through his servants, hired labour, or hired stock. A tenant-at-will, though not a trespasser, remains a tenant with a lawful possessory right until tenancy is determined by a proper notice expiring with the agricultural year. His possession is not the landlord's possession, and his cultivation cannot be equated with cultivation by the landlord himself or by his servants or hired labour.

Conclusion: The land in the tenants-at-will's possession was not in the intermediary's khas possession on the date of vesting, and the appellant could not claim the benefit of Section 6.

Issue (ii): Whether the intermediary's mere right to take possession from a tenant-at-will amounted to khas possession for the purpose of Section 6.

Analysis: The argument that a subsisting right to recover possession should be treated as khas possession was rejected as inconsistent with the statutory language. Khas possession denotes actual physical control in the sense contemplated by the Act, not a bare right to recover possession. The earlier decisions relied upon by the Court had already ruled that a mere subsisting title or right to obtain possession does not satisfy Section 6. A tenant-at-will can resist eviction until the tenancy is validly terminated, and therefore the landlord is not in actual possession merely because he may eventually be entitled to possession.

Conclusion: A mere right to take possession is not khas possession under Section 6, and this contention failed.

Issue (iii): Whether the appellant could rely on the alleged settlement said to have been made during the pendency of the proceedings or on the High Court's earlier procedural order to sustain the appeal.

Analysis: The request to adduce additional evidence regarding a supposed settlement could not be entertained at that stage because the validity and effect of any such settlement could not be determined in the appeal and its introduction would prejudice the respondents. The contention based on the High Court's earlier order dismissing the appeal for non-compliance also failed because the point had not been pressed before the High Court and, in any event, the court retained power to extend time, which it had done.

Conclusion: Neither the alleged settlement nor the procedural objection assisted the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The appellant had no subsisting right to evict the respondents after vesting, because the suit lands were not in his khas possession within the statutory meaning on the relevant date, and no procedural ground warranted interference with the High Court's decision.

Ratio Decidendi: For Section 6 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, khas possession means actual possession of the intermediary as statutorily defined, and it does not include a mere right to recover possession from a tenant-at-will.

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