Cancellation of bail already granted needs cogent, overwhelming supervening circumstances; mere reconsideration of merits is insufficient.

Bail already granted cannot be cancelled merely by reappreciating the merits; cancellation requires cogent, overwhelming and supervening circumstances. The controlling distinction is between refusal of bail at the initial stage and cancellation of an existing bail order. Continued liberty may be withdrawn only where there is misuse of the concession, absconding, interference with the administration of justice, evasion of justice, or other circumstances making release inconsistent with a fair trial. Mechanical cancellation without such basis is legally unsustainable.

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Issues: Whether the High Court was justified in cancelling bail already granted to the appellant, and whether such cancellation was sustainable in the absence of cogent and overwhelming circumstances or supervening factors.

Analysis: The distinction between rejection of bail at the initial stage and cancellation of bail already granted is material. Bail once granted is not to be cancelled mechanically; cancellation requires very cogent and overwhelming circumstances showing interference with the administration of justice, evasion of justice, abuse of the concession, absconding, or other supervening circumstances rendering continued liberty inconsistent with a fair trial. The High Court overlooked these principles and cancelled the bail in a mechanical manner.

Conclusion: The cancellation of bail was unsustainable and was set aside. The order granting bail was restored.

Final Conclusion: The appellant succeeded, and the bail granted by the Sessions Court stood revived, with the trial directed to proceed expeditiously.

Ratio Decidendi: Bail already granted can be cancelled only on cogent, overwhelming, and supervening circumstances showing misuse of liberty or necessity to protect the due course of justice; it cannot be withdrawn mechanically merely on reconsideration of the merits.

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