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Issues: Whether the order granting bail to a woman accused of offences under the Companies Act was perverse or liable to be set aside in exercise of inherent powers, and whether absence of supervening circumstances justified interference with the bail already granted.
Analysis: The challenge was directed against the bail order under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and not by way of cancellation under section 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Interference with an already granted bail order requires a clear infirmity, illegality, or perversity in the order, or cogent supervening circumstances showing misuse of liberty or prejudice to fair trial. The bail order had been passed after considering the statutory scheme of section 212(6) of the Companies Act, 2013, including its proviso for women, and after noting the absence of material showing flight risk, tampering with evidence, or influence over witnesses. The investigation had substantially progressed, the complaint had been filed, cognizance had been taken, and there was no concrete material showing that further custody was necessary or that the respondent had breached bail conditions.
Conclusion: The bail order was neither perverse nor illegal, and no supervening circumstance was shown to warrant interference. The challenge failed and the bail granted to the respondent was upheld.
Ratio Decidendi: An order granting bail cannot be set aside in inherent jurisdiction unless it is shown to be perverse, illegal, or based on irrelevant material, and once the statutory proviso favouring a woman accused is duly considered, interference is unwarranted in the absence of supervening circumstances or misuse of liberty.