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Issues: Whether the appellant had laid the necessary factual foundation for adducing secondary evidence of the disclaimer letter under the Evidence Act.
Analysis: Primary evidence is the normal rule, and secondary evidence is admissible only in the exceptional situations contemplated by the Evidence Act. A party seeking to rely on secondary evidence must establish that the original has been lost, destroyed, or is otherwise unavailable for reasons beyond that party's default, and the secondary copy must be supported by foundational evidence showing that it is a true copy of the original. The evidence on record showed that the photocopy of the disclaimer letter came from the custody of the defence estate office and the official who produced the record was examined. The mere fact that some signatures were faded or not legible was not, by itself, sufficient to reject the application for secondary evidence.
Conclusion: The appellant had satisfied the requirements for letting in secondary evidence, and the High Court's order rejecting that request was unsustainable.
Ratio Decidendi: Secondary evidence of a document is admissible when the party establishes the loss or unavailability of the original through no fault of its own and supports the copy with proper foundational proof of authenticity; admissibility is distinct from proof of the document's contents and genuineness at trial.