Partner notice under Partnership Act defeated quashing challenge to a cheque dishonour summoning order under Section 482 CrPC.

Notice to a partner who habitually acts in the business of a firm operates as notice to the firm under Section 24 of the Partnership Act, absent any plea of fraud, so the petitioners could not avoid Section 138 NI Act proceedings on a purely technical objection that they were not personally served. The Court found the firm had already received notice through a partner, the dishonour of cheques was undisputed, and the summoning order disclosed no infirmity. In these circumstances, exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC was not warranted to quash the prosecution or prevent abuse of process, and the quashing petition failed.

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Issues: Whether the petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be exercised to quash the summoning order in a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, and whether notice to one partner, who habitually acts in the business of the firm, operates as notice to the other partners under Section 24 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932.

Analysis: The complaint alleged dishonour of cheques issued by the firm and asserted that the petitioners, though not personally served with notice, were partners who were supervising the business, while their husbands were acting for the firm. On that footing, Section 24 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 was applied to hold that notice to a partner who habitually acts in the business of the firm operates as notice to the firm, except in cases of fraud, which was not pleaded. The Court also found that the petitioners could not rely on a purely technical plea of absence of direct notice when the firm had already received notice through a partner and the dishonour of cheques was not disputed. It further held that the summoning order did not suffer from infirmity and that the case did not justify invocation of inherent powers to prevent abuse of process or to secure the ends of justice.

Conclusion: The petitioners were not entitled to quashing of the summoning order, and the petition for exercise of inherent jurisdiction failed.

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