Quashing of second FIR for abuse of process where director had resigned before the alleged corporate defaults arose.

A second FIR based on substantially similar allegations was quashed as an abuse of process where an earlier complaint had already raised the same accusations. The petitioner's resignation as director in 1997 was supported by Form No. 32 and was not effectively disputed, so he could not be fastened with criminal liability for alleged defaults arising after he had ceased to be associated with the company. As the impugned allegations related to non-forwarding of accounts from 1999-2000 onwards, they did not disclose a prima facie basis to prosecute him after resignation. The FIR was therefore quashed insofar as it concerned the petitioner.

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Issues: Whether the second FIR alleging similar irregularities was liable to be quashed, and whether the petitioner could be prosecuted for acts allegedly committed after he had resigned as a director.

Analysis: The petitioner had resigned as director in 1997, and the resignation stood supported by Form No. 32 and was not effectively disputed. The impugned FIR was filed later in relation to allegations that the company had not forwarded accounts from 1999-2000 onwards, whereas the petitioner had ceased to be associated with the company before that period. The record also showed an earlier complaint on substantially similar allegations, making the later FIR a second prosecution on the same set of accusations. In these circumstances, continuing the criminal proceedings against the petitioner would amount to abuse of process, particularly when the allegations did not disclose a prima facie basis for fastening liability on him after his resignation.

Conclusion: The FIR was quashed insofar as it concerned the petitioner, and the petition was allowed.

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