Appealability under arbitration law: refusal to condone delay in a Section 34 challenge is not independently appealable.

An appeal under Section 37(1)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act is not maintainable against an order refusing to condone delay in filing a Section 34 application where binding precedent governs the scope of appealability. The Court examined the interaction between Sections 34 and 37 of the Act and Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, noting the argument that a limitation-related order does not decide the award on merits, but also the contrary view that refusal to condone delay effectively bars challenge to the award. Applying Supreme Court precedent, it concluded that such an order does not fall within the statutory ambit of Section 37, and the appeal was dismissed.

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Issues: Whether an appeal under Section 37(1)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 lies against an order refusing to condone delay in filing an application under Section 34 of the Act.

Analysis: The appeal challenged refusal to condone delay in filing the Section 34 petition. The Court examined the scheme of Section 34 and Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the role of Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, and the effect of binding precedent. It noted the competing views that an order under Section 34(3) concerns limitation and does not adjudicate the merits of the award, but also considered the contrary position that refusal to condone delay effectively bars recourse against the award. The Court held itself bound by the Supreme Court's decisions governing the scope of appealability under Section 37 and by the speaking order in the connected precedent, and therefore concluded that the impugned order did not furnish a maintainable appeal under Section 37.

Conclusion: The appeal was held not maintainable.

Final Conclusion: The order refusing condonation of delay could not be assailed in the present appeal, and the challenge was dismissed, while certificate was granted.

Ratio Decidendi: An appeal under Section 37(1)(b) lies only against orders that fall within the statutory ambit of refusal to set aside an arbitral award, and an order refusing condonation of delay in filing the Section 34 application is not independently appealable where binding precedent governs otherwise.

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