Limitation under arbitration law runs from meaningful receipt of the award, and "three months" means a calendar month period.

For limitation under section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, an arbitral award left at a government office on a holiday is treated as received only when it reaches the officer competent to act on it on the next working day; the date of physical delivery on the holiday is not the date of receipt. "Three months" in section 34(3) means a calendar-month period, not 90 days, and is computed by the corresponding date in the third succeeding month. Applying that method, the section 34 application was filed within limitation, including the further condonable thirty-day period, so dismissal by the High Court was unsustainable and the matter had to be remitted for decision on merits.

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Issues: (i) When does limitation commence for an application under section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, where the arbitral award is physically delivered in the office of a government authority on a holiday? (ii) Whether the expression "three months" in section 34(3) means 90 days. (iii) Whether the application under section 34 was within limitation, including the further condonable period of thirty days.

Issue (i): When does limitation commence for an application under section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, where the arbitral award is physically delivered in the office of a government authority on a holiday?

Analysis: The expression "received" in section 31(5) has to be understood as receipt by the party in a meaningful sense, not mere physical delivery to any office staff on a non-working day. When an award is left in the office of a party on a holiday, receipt occurs only when the award reaches the person competent to act on it on the next working day. The day of receipt is excluded in computing limitation under section 12(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963 and section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897.

Conclusion: Limitation commenced on the next working day, and the date of physical delivery on the holiday was not the date of receipt.

Issue (ii): Whether the expression "three months" in section 34(3) means 90 days.

Analysis: A month means a calendar month, not a fixed period of 30 days. The legislature deliberately used "three months" in the main provision and "thirty days" in the proviso, showing that the two expressions are not interchangeable. The period therefore expires on the corresponding date in the third succeeding month, depending on the calendar.

Conclusion: "Three months" does not mean 90 days.

Issue (iii): Whether the application under section 34 was within limitation, including the further condonable period of thirty days.

Analysis: Since receipt occurred on the next working day, the period of three months was to be counted from the following day and expired on the corresponding date in the third month. The additional thirty days under the proviso were then computed from the next day and also expired after accounting for the length of February. On that computation, the application was filed before the last permissible date.

Conclusion: The application was filed within the period of limitation and within the condonable delay period.

Final Conclusion: The delay was condonable, the dismissal by the High Court was unsustainable, and the section 34 petition had to be considered on merits after remand.

Ratio Decidendi: For limitation under section 34(3), an arbitral award delivered to a government office on a holiday is received on the next working day, and "three months" means a calendar-month period computed by corresponding date, not 90 days.

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