Discretionary committal under money laundering law cannot transfer a corruption predicate offence to a court lacking jurisdiction.

Section 44(1)(c) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 was construed as conferring a discretionary power to seek committal of a scheduled offence, not a mandatory transfer in every case, because committal depends on an authorised officer's application and judicial scrutiny. The provision cannot be used to send a predicate offence to a Special Court that lacks independent jurisdiction under the Prevention of Corruption Act. Harmonious construction was applied to preserve the competence of the court otherwise empowered to try the scheduled offence, and the committal order was held unsustainable where the special PMLA court was not itself a competent corruption court.

---

---

Issues: (i) Whether Section 44(1)(c) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 makes committal of the scheduled offence to the Special Court under that Act mandatory in every case. (ii) Whether the Special Court under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 can be treated as competent to try a scheduled offence triable only by a Special Judge under the Prevention of Corruption Act.

Issue (i): Whether Section 44(1)(c) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 makes committal of the scheduled offence to the Special Court under that Act mandatory in every case.

Analysis: The statutory scheme links money-laundering prosecution with a scheduled offence, but it does not require that every scheduled offence be transferred to the Special Court under the money-laundering law. Section 44(1)(c) authorises committal only on an application by the authorised officer. Reading the provision as compulsory in all cases would make the provision for application redundant and could defeat the purpose of the Act where the predicate offence is already triable by another competent court. The Court therefore construed the provision as conferring a discretion on the authorised officer, and requiring judicial application of mind before any committal order is passed.

Conclusion: Section 44(1)(c) is not mandatory in every case and committal is permissible only in appropriate cases on a reasoned application.

Issue (ii): Whether the Special Court under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 can be treated as competent to try a scheduled offence triable only by a Special Judge under the Prevention of Corruption Act.

Analysis: The Court held that the overriding clause in the money-laundering statute operates only to the extent of inconsistency and within the field covered by that Act. It does not enlarge the substantive jurisdiction of a court that is otherwise not empowered under the special corruption law. Since the predicate offence here was triable only by a Special Judge notified under the Prevention of Corruption Act, a transfer to the money-laundering Special Court, which lacked that jurisdiction, would be legally impermissible and would produce an absurd result. The Court read the provisions harmoniously and rejected any construction that would permit committal to a court inherently lacking competence.

Conclusion: The Special Court under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 is not competent to try the predicate offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act unless it is otherwise a court of competent jurisdiction under that Act.

Final Conclusion: The committal order was unsustainable in law, and the challenge succeeded. The scheduled offence was directed to continue before the competent court under the Prevention of Corruption Act, while the money-laundering proceedings were not permitted to displace that jurisdiction merely because of the connected allegation.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 44(1)(c) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 confers only a discretionary power to seek committal of a scheduled offence, and it cannot be used to transfer a case to a court that lacks independent jurisdiction to try that predicate offence.

---