Limitation for refusal orders starts on communication where no notice was given; time-bar rejection remains a refusal under Registration law.

When a refusal order under the Indian Registration Act is made without notice of the date of pronouncement, limitation under Sections 73(1) and 77 runs from communication of that order, because the adverse order is not operative against the affected party until it is known to them. A Registrar's rejection of an application as time-barred still qualifies as a refusal order under Section 77, and the statute does not distinguish between refusal on merits and refusal on limitation. Applying that construction, the application before the Registrar was within time when measured from communication, so the suit under Section 77 was maintainable and the remand order was upheld.

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Issues: (i) Whether the period of limitation under Sections 73(1) and 77 of the Indian Registration Act runs from the date on which the refusal order is made or from the date on which it is communicated to the affected party when no notice was given of the date of pronouncement; (ii) whether a Registrar's rejection of an application as time-barred is an order of refusal within Section 77.

Issue (i): Whether the period of limitation under Sections 73(1) and 77 of the Indian Registration Act runs from the date on which the refusal order is made or from the date on which it is communicated to the affected party when no notice was given of the date of pronouncement.

Analysis: The expression "making of the order" was construed in the context of the Act as requiring that the order be passed in the presence of the parties or after notice to them. Where no date was fixed for pronouncement and no notice was given, the party affected had no reasonable opportunity of knowing of the adverse order. In such circumstances, the order could not be treated as operative against that party until it was communicated. The relevant statutory scheme in Sections 35, 71, 73(1), 76 and 77 supported this construction, because the right to approach the Registrar or Civil Court depends on an effective and knowable refusal order.

Conclusion: Limitation runs, in such a case, from the date of communication of the refusal order, not from the date on which the order was merely signed or recorded.

Issue (ii): Whether a Registrar's rejection of an application as time-barred is an order of refusal within Section 77.

Analysis: Section 76 and Section 77 do not draw any distinction between a refusal on the merits and a refusal on the ground of limitation. An order rejecting the application as time-barred is still an order of refusal for the purposes of the Act. However, where the application to the Registrar was in fact within time when computed from communication of the Sub-Registrar's order, the rejection of that application as time-barred was erroneous and the condition precedent for the suit under Section 77 stood satisfied.

Conclusion: The rejection order was an order of refusal, but it was wrong because the application to the Registrar was in time; the suit under Section 77 was maintainable.

Final Conclusion: The appeal was liable to fail, and the plaintiff's suit was not barred by limitation. The order of remand was upheld.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statutory refusal order is made without notice or prior opportunity of hearing, limitation begins only when the order is communicated or otherwise brought to the knowledge of the affected party; a refusal on limitation remains a refusal order, but only a valid and operative refusal can trigger the statutory time limit.

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