Restitution of conjugal rights: compromise to live apart does not defeat the claim absent fresh demand and refusal.

A suit for restitution of conjugal rights was held not barred by limitation because Article 35 of the Limitation Act, 1877 applies only when demand and refusal occurred more than two years before suit, and a prior compromise resuming cohabitation broke the earlier demand-refusal basis; in the absence of any fresh demand and refusal after the compromise, limitation did not run. The compromise also did not defeat the claim, because it was treated as ineffective on the facts and, in any event, an agreement to live apart was inconsistent with Hindu law and opposed to public policy. The dismissal was reversed and the decree for restitution was restored.

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Issues: (i) Whether the suit for restitution of conjugal rights was barred by limitation under Article 35 of the Limitation Act, 1877; (ii) Whether the compromise agreement between the spouses barred the suit.

Issue (i): Whether the suit for restitution of conjugal rights was barred by limitation under Article 35 of the Limitation Act, 1877.

Analysis: Article 35 applies only where there has been a demand and refusal more than two years before suit. A prior suit for restitution had been compromised, and by that compromise the parties agreed to resume cohabitation. After such settlement, the earlier demand and refusal could not continue to furnish the starting point of limitation. In the absence of any fresh demand and refusal after the compromise, time did not run against the claim.

Conclusion: The suit was not barred by limitation.

Issue (ii): Whether the compromise agreement between the spouses barred the suit.

Analysis: The agreement was treated as ineffective on the facts because it contemplated living together and provided for separation only after cohabitation had resumed. Independently, the marriage obligations of Hindu spouses were governed by Hindu law under Section 16 of Madras Act III of 1873, and an agreement to live apart was regarded as contrary to that law and, in any event, opposed to public policy. The agreement was therefore incapable of defeating the claim for restitution of conjugal rights.

Conclusion: The agreement did not bar the suit.

Final Conclusion: The decree dismissing the suit was set aside and the original decree was restored, so the claim for restitution of conjugal rights succeeded.

Ratio Decidendi: A compromise or agreement to live apart does not bar a suit for restitution of conjugal rights where no fresh demand and refusal has occurred after the compromise and the agreement is inconsistent with Hindu law or public policy.

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