Criminal discharge bars permit suspension when administrative action rests on the same alleged offence.

A quasi-judicial transport authority could not sustain suspension of a public carrier permit on the basis of an alleged smuggling offence where the competent criminal court had already discharged the driver on the same facts before the administrative order was finalised. The authority was bound to take account of the criminal court's final finding, and it could not proceed as if the offence had still been established. The suspension order and the appellate order were therefore unsustainable and were quashed.

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Issues: Whether a quasi-judicial transport authority could sustain suspension of a public carrier permit on the basis of an alleged offence when the competent criminal court had already discharged the driver on the same accusation.

Analysis: The order suspending the permit was founded on the alleged smuggling offence, which was the very matter investigated in the criminal prosecution. The criminal court had discharged the accused driver before the transport authority finally disposed of the matter. In such circumstances, the findings and orders of the competent criminal court could not be ignored by the transport authority when the proposed action depended wholly on the same offence. Where the prosecution has already ended in discharge or acquittal before the administrative order, the authority cannot proceed on the footing that the offence was nevertheless established. The earlier criminal order therefore displaced the basis of the suspension order.

Conclusion: The suspension order and the appellate order were unsustainable and were quashed; the decision was in favour of the petitioner.

Ratio Decidendi: A quasi-judicial authority cannot base punitive action on an offence that has already been negatived by a final order of a competent criminal court on the same facts.

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