Preventive detention under COFEPOSA fails if one ground is invalid; courts cannot sever and sustain the order on remaining material.

In preventive detention under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act, the presence of one irrelevant, non-existent, vague, or otherwise invalid ground vitiates the entire detention order because the detention rests on the detaining authority's subjective satisfaction. The court cannot apply severance by ignoring the bad ground and then asking whether the authority would have reached the same satisfaction on the remaining material, as that would amount to an impermissible review of sufficiency. The Act does not alter this principle, and the order cannot be salvaged on surviving grounds alone.

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Issues: (i) Whether, in preventive detention under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act, 1974, the existence of one invalid ground requires the entire detention order to be set aside. (ii) Whether the court can apply a rule of severance and sustain the order by excluding the bad ground and examining whether the detaining authority would have reached the same subjective satisfaction on the remaining ground or grounds. (iii) Whether, on the facts of the connected matters, the surviving common ground could sustain detention.

Issue (i): Whether, in preventive detention under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act, 1974, the existence of one invalid ground requires the entire detention order to be set aside.

Analysis: The decision reviews the line of authority on preventive detention and holds that the statutory foundation remains the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. Where detention is based on several basic facts or materials and one of them is irrelevant, non-existent, vague, or otherwise bad, the court cannot know what weighed with the authority when the order was made. The COFEPOSA Act does not alter that position either expressly or by necessary implication, and the earlier rule remains applicable with full force.

Conclusion: Yes. If one of the several grounds is bad, the entire detention order is vitiated and must be set aside.

Issue (ii): Whether the court can apply a rule of severance and sustain the order by excluding the bad ground and examining whether the detaining authority would have reached the same subjective satisfaction on the remaining ground or grounds.

Analysis: The judgment rejects severance in the field of preventive detention. Once the order rests on subjective satisfaction, the court cannot substitute its own view by asking whether the authority would have acted on the surviving grounds alone. That kind of inquiry would amount to testing sufficiency or adequacy of the material, which is impermissible in this branch of law. The changes made by the COFEPOSA Act, including the revised reporting and review scheme, do not justify a different approach.

Conclusion: No. The court cannot exclude the bad ground and uphold the order on the remaining grounds by applying a reasonable-man test.

Issue (iii): Whether, on the facts of the connected matters, the surviving common ground could sustain detention.

Analysis: Since the answer to the severance question is in the negative, the factual inquiry whether the remaining common ground could independently justify detention does not survive for consideration.

Conclusion: The question does not arise.

Final Conclusion: The reference settles that, in preventive detention under the COFEPOSA Act, a detention order based on multiple grounds falls as a whole if any one ground is legally bad, and the court cannot salvage the order by severing and evaluating the remaining grounds separately.

Ratio Decidendi: In preventive detention founded on subjective satisfaction, the presence of any irrelevant, non-existent, vague, or otherwise invalid ground vitiates the entire order, and courts cannot uphold such an order by severing the bad ground and reappraising the sufficiency of the remaining material.

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