1974 (11) TMI 90 - SC - Indian Laws

Preventive detention communication requirements: only materials constituting grounds must be disclosed and nondisclosure of other particulars does not invalidate detention

The text addresses procedural requirements for preventive detention, focusing on the obligation to communicate the materials that constitute the grounds ... Validity of the detention of the petitioner under an order of detention, passed by the District Magistrate, Malda under sub-section (1) read with subsection (2) of section 3 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 - requirement of communication - power of detention - violation of fundamental right of personal liberty - inter-relation between the requirements of the first and the second safeguards - Held that:- The Court is entitled to examine the correctness of this statement and determine for itself whether there were any other basic facts or materials, apart from those admitted by it, which could have reasonably influenced the decision of the detaining authority and for that purpose, the Court can certainly require the detaining authority to produce and make available to the Court the entire record of the case which was before it. That is the least the Court can do to ensure observance of the requirements of law by the detaining authority. The second circumstance was not directed against any activity of the petitioner at all. It merely provided the background of the social malady which must have been exercising the mind of the authority charged with the administration of law and order when it said that there were several thefts of transformers from Betrabad, Uttar Lakshipur, Sultanganj and Nandlalpur villages and it was in the context of this back-round that the three incidents referred to in the grounds of detention were considered by the District Magistrate. What were alleged against the petitioner were only the three incidents set out in the grounds of detention. The thefts of transformers referred to in the second circumstance were not attributed to the petitioner. They merely provided the backdrop of the prevailing situation in the area and did not constitute material prejudicial to the petitioner which ought to have been disclosed to him. There was, therefore, no material before the District Magistrate, other than the three incidents set out in the grounds of detention, which went into the formation of the subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate and which ought, therefore, to have been communicated to the petitioner. There can be no doubt that when the Court made these observations, what it had in mind was the materials which constituted the grounds of detention and not 'other particulars', for the making of the order of detention would be based on the former and not on the latter and so also its approval by the State Government. What the Court meant to say in making these observations was that all the materials on which the order of detention is made or approved, that is, the materials constituting the grounds of detention, must be communicated to the detenu and not that ' other particulars' communicated to the State Government under section 3, sub-section (3) which do not form the basis of the making of the order, of detention or its approval should be disclosed to the detenu. The Court could not have intended to say that in addition to the grounds of detention 'other particulars' mentioned in section 3, sub-section (3) should also be communicated to the detenu when there is no requirement to that effect either in Article 22(5) of the Constitution or in any provision of the Act. We may point out that in fact no such question arose for decision in that case and the Court was not called upon to decide whether 'other particulars' communicated to the State Govemment under section 3, sub-section (3) are required to be disclosed to the detenu. The Court merely reiterated the well-settled proposition that the materials constituting the grounds of detention on which the order of detention is made by the District Magistrate and approved by the State Government must be communicated to the detenu. The observations made by the Court did not go further than this and cannot be read in the manner contended on behalf of the petitioner. The material from the history-sheet, which was not disclosed to the petitioner, did not form part of the grounds of detention on which the order of detention was made by the District Magistrate and approved by the State Government, but merely constituted 'other particulars' communicated by the District Magistrate to the State Government under section 3, sub-section (3). There was, therefore, no obligation on the District Magistrate or the State Government to disclose this material to the petitioner and the nondisclosure of which to the petitioner did not have the effect of invalidating the approval of the State Government to the order of detention. We accordingly dismiss the petition and discharge the rule. Issues Involved:1. Sufficiency of grounds for detention.2. Subjective satisfaction versus objective standards in detention.3. Impact of undisclosed material on the validity of detention.4. Validity of the State Government's approval of the detention order.Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:1. Sufficiency of Grounds for Detention:The petitioner challenged the detention order dated 3rd November 1973, arguing that the three incidents of theft cited were not sufficient to justify the detention. The court noted that the power of detention is preventive and based on suspicion or anticipation rather than proof. The court emphasized that the satisfaction required for detention is subjective and not subject to objective standards. The court concluded that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority, based on the three incidents, was sufficient for the detention order.2. Subjective Satisfaction versus Objective Standards:The petitioner argued that if the power of detention is exercised based solely on subjective satisfaction, it imposes unreasonable restrictions on fundamental rights under Article 19 and is ultra vires. The court reiterated that the power of detention is based on subjective satisfaction due to its preventive nature. The court highlighted that subjective satisfaction is not immune from judicial review, and courts can examine whether the satisfaction was genuinely arrived at. The court concluded that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority was valid and not subject to objective standards.3. Impact of Undisclosed Material on the Validity of Detention:The petitioner contended that the history-sheet containing additional material was before the District Magistrate and influenced the detention order, but this material was not disclosed to the petitioner. The court emphasized that all basic facts and materials influencing the detaining authority must be communicated to the detenu. However, the court found that the undisclosed material in the history-sheet did not constitute additional prejudicial material and was merely a generalization based on the three incidents. Therefore, the non-disclosure did not invalidate the detention order.4. Validity of the State Government's Approval of the Detention Order:The petitioner argued that the State Government's approval of the detention order was based on undisclosed material from the history-sheet. The court noted that the State Government must consider all basic facts and materials constituting the grounds of detention for approval. However, the court found that the undisclosed material was not part of the grounds of detention but merely 'other particulars' communicated by the District Magistrate. The court concluded that there was no obligation to disclose these 'other particulars' to the detenu, and the State Government's approval was valid.Conclusion:The court dismissed the petition, affirming that the detention order was valid, the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority was justified, and the non-disclosure of certain material did not invalidate the detention or the State Government's approval. The petition was dismissed, and the rule was discharged.