Temple renovation rights depend on whether the original deity still subsists at the old site, not merely on a new installation.

Where the original deity was still believed to be embedded at the old temple site, the installation of the utsavar in a newly built temple and use of some old materials did not by itself extinguish the religious character of the original site. On those facts, villagers were not precluded from renovating the old temple, so no injunction could be granted against reconstruction. The statutory procedure for inquiry into a religious institution alleged to have ceased to exist did not apply because cessation at the old site was itself the disputed issue. The suit was therefore not barred by that provision, but the claim for restraint failed.

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Issues: (i) Whether the plaintiffs were entitled to restrain the defendant from renovating the old temple at its original site on the footing that the deity had been shifted to the newly built temple; (ii) Whether the suit was barred by the statutory procedure relating to a religious institution alleged to have ceased to exist.

Issue (i): Whether the plaintiffs were entitled to restrain the defendant from renovating the old temple at its original site on the footing that the deity had been shifted to the newly built temple.

Analysis: The decisive consideration was that the Moolavar of the old temple was still believed to be embedded at the original site, and the installation of the Utsavar in the new temple, coupled with the use of some materials of the old structure, did not by itself divest the old site of all religious character. The question was not whether the new temple was efficacious, but whether the villagers were precluded from attempting to renovate the temple at the old site. On those facts, the attempt to reconstruct the old temple could not be treated as unlawful.

Conclusion: The plaintiffs were not entitled to an injunction, and this issue was decided against them.

Issue (ii): Whether the suit was barred by the statutory procedure relating to a religious institution alleged to have ceased to exist.

Analysis: The statutory procedure for inquiry into a religious institution that has ceased to exist did not govern the present dispute, because the very controversy was whether the deity had ceased to exist at the old site at all. That question could not be left to the Deputy Commissioner in the first instance, since it was foundational to the claim for renovation and injunction.

Conclusion: The suit was not barred by the statutory provision, and this issue was decided against the defendant.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed because the plaintiffs could not establish a right to injunct the renovation of the old temple, and the statutory objection to the suit was rejected.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the original deity is still traceable at the old site, the mere installation of the utsavar in a new temple does not, by itself, extinguish the right of villagers to renovate the old temple, and the statutory inquiry procedure for a ceased institution does not bar a suit when the very existence of cessation at the site is in dispute.

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