Requisition of land for public purposes upheld where legislative competence, compensation scheme, and administrative character were recognised.

A statutory power to requisition land was treated as distinct from acquisition and within legislative competence. The purposes stated in the enactment, including maintenance of essential supplies and rehabilitation or allotment of land to landless, flood-affected, or displaced persons, were held to satisfy the public purpose requirement under Article 31(2). The compensation scheme was upheld because Article 31(2) required provision for compensation, not judicial reassessment of its adequacy, and the special treatment of certain grant or settlement lands was not confiscatory. Requisition and appellate orders were characterised as administrative, so writ interference was refused where disputed facts, natural justice objections, and mala fides were not established.

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Issues: (i) whether the Provincial Legislature had competence to enact a law providing for requisition of land; (ii) whether the purposes specified for requisition satisfied the requirement of public purpose under Article 31(2); (iii) whether the compensation provisions were confiscatory or otherwise unconstitutional; and (iv) whether the impugned requisition and appellate orders were liable to be struck down for want of natural justice, excess of jurisdiction, or mala fides.

Issue (i): whether the Provincial Legislature had competence to enact a law providing for requisition of land.

Analysis: Requisition was treated as distinct from acquisition and not as a mere incident of compulsory acquisition. In view of the then existing constitutional and legislative arrangement, and the later recognition that requisitioning was a separate subject, the power to legislate for requisition of land was held to exist. The argument that the enactment was beyond competence therefore failed.

Conclusion: The law was within legislative competence.

Issue (ii): whether the purposes specified for requisition satisfied the requirement of public purpose under Article 31(2).

Analysis: The purposes stated in the enactment, including maintaining essential supplies and services, providing facilities necessary for community life, and allotting land to landless, flood-affected, or displaced persons, were held to be public purposes. The requirement of public purpose need not be set out in formulaic terms if the statute, read as a whole, confines the power to purposes that are public in character. The purpose of rehabilitation and distribution of land to the landless was treated as falling squarely within that concept.

Conclusion: The requisition power was upheld as being confined to public purposes.

Issue (iii): whether the compensation provisions were confiscatory or otherwise unconstitutional.

Analysis: Article 31(2) was construed as requiring provision for compensation, but not as making the adequacy of compensation justiciable by objective judicial standard. The Legislature was held entitled to prescribe the amount, principles, and manner of determination. The special rules for land held under grants or settlements for special cultivation were also upheld, the Court finding that they did not amount to no compensation at all or to a fraud on the Constitution.

Conclusion: The compensation scheme was held valid.

Issue (iv): whether the impugned requisition and appellate orders were liable to be struck down for want of natural justice, excess of jurisdiction, or mala fides.

Analysis: The original requisition order and the appellate order were treated as administrative in character. No judicial or quasi-judicial duty was imposed by the statute, and the mere grant of an appeal did not convert the proceeding into a quasi-judicial one. On the facts, the alleged denial of the report and the allegations of mala fides were not established on the affidavit material. Questions turning on disputed facts, including whether the land was used for charitable purposes or whether particular buildings were exempt, were left to ordinary civil remedies.

Conclusion: No ground was made out for interference with the orders under Article 226.

Final Conclusion: The petition failed in all material respects and the impugned orders were sustained, though leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was granted on substantial constitutional questions.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory power of requisition aimed at public purposes is valid if the law provides a constitutionally sufficient scheme for compensation, and administrative requisition orders under such a statute are not ordinarily vulnerable under writ jurisdiction on grounds that require resolution of disputed facts or a judicial-type hearing not contemplated by the statute.

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