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Issues: (i) whether the requirement that orders of the Governor-General in Council be expressed and signed in the manner stated in section 40(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935 was mandatory or merely directory, and whether the impugned orders substantially complied with that provision; (ii) whether the expiry of the Defence of India Act, 1939 and the revocation of the emergency brought to an end the Tribunal's existence or the pending prosecutions, or whether the relevant saving provisions preserved them.
Issue (i): whether the requirement that orders of the Governor-General in Council be expressed and signed in the manner stated in section 40(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935 was mandatory or merely directory, and whether the impugned orders substantially complied with that provision.
Analysis: The provision was read in its context as regulating the form in which orders and proceedings were expressed and authenticated, not as laying down the only mode by which valid orders could be made. The language of the section, including its reference to both orders and proceedings and its focus on expression and signature, indicated a requirement of publication and record rather than a condition precedent to validity. The Court also held that a strict mandatory construction would cause serious inconvenience and would not accord with the scope and purpose of the Constitution Act. On the facts, the phrase "Central Government" in the impugned orders was to be construed, by reason of the statutory scheme and the General Clauses Act, as equivalent to the Governor-General in Council, so the substance of the requirement was satisfied.
Conclusion: The provision was held to be directory, and the impugned orders were treated as validly made in substance.
Issue (ii): whether the expiry of the Defence of India Act, 1939 and the revocation of the emergency brought to an end the Tribunal's existence or the pending prosecutions, or whether the relevant saving provisions preserved them.
Analysis: The Court held that the ordinance-making and emergency provisions had to be construed so that ordinances and orders issued during the period of emergency did not automatically lapse merely because the emergency later ended. The saving clauses inserted into the Defence of India Act, 1939 and the amended constitutional provisions preserved things done, liabilities incurred, and legal proceedings already instituted or continued in respect of contraventions committed while the law was in force. The Court relied on the statutory language protecting prior acts and pending proceedings, and also treated the reasoning in comparable emergency legislation as confirming that prosecutions for earlier breaches could continue after expiry. The Tribunal was therefore not shown to have ceased to exist or lost jurisdiction before the relevant validating legislation continued it.
Conclusion: The expiry provisions did not defeat the pending proceedings, and the Tribunal's jurisdiction and the prosecutions were preserved.
Final Conclusion: The appeals failed because the challenged orders were not invalid for want of compliance with section 40(1), and the pending proceedings were saved despite the expiry of the temporary emergency legislation.
Ratio Decidendi: Where statutory language governs the form of official orders and the continuation of emergency proceedings, a court will construe the formality as directory rather than mandatory if the scheme shows that the provision is concerned with authentication and record, and saving clauses will preserve prior liabilities and pending proceedings after the expiry of a temporary enactment.