Broad interpretation of occupation supports eviction for running a school; separate conversion permission is not a prerequisite.

A second eviction application was held maintainable because the earlier refusal did not bar a later request based on the amended ground of the landlord's own occupation. Permission under Clause 12 for conversion of a residential building into a non-residential one was not a condition precedent to eviction under Clause 9, as the provisions served different purposes. The word "occupation" in Clause 9(3)(a) was construed broadly to include constructive occupation through running a school. On that footing, the premises were found required for bona fide occupation and the eviction order was treated as within jurisdiction.

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Issues: (i) whether a second eviction application based on the landlord's requirement of the premises for a school was barred after an earlier application had failed; (ii) whether permission under Clause 12 of the Mysore House Rent & Accommodation Control Order was a condition precedent to an eviction application under Clause 9; and (iii) whether the requirement of the premises for running a school amounted to "occupation" within Clause 9(3)(a).

Issue (i): whether a second eviction application based on the landlord's requirement of the premises for a school was barred after an earlier application had failed.

Analysis: The subsequent application rested on the amended provision enabling a landlord to seek possession for his own occupation. The earlier rejection did not bar the later application because the legal basis for eviction had since become available.

Conclusion: The second application was not barred.

Issue (ii): whether permission under Clause 12 of the Mysore House Rent & Accommodation Control Order was a condition precedent to an eviction application under Clause 9.

Analysis: Clause 12 regulated conversion of a residential building into a non-residential one, but it did not operate as a prerequisite to an eviction application under Clause 9. The two provisions served different purposes, and the absence of permission under Clause 12 did not by itself invalidate the landlord's request for eviction.

Conclusion: Permission under Clause 12 was not a condition precedent to the eviction application.

Issue (iii): whether the requirement of the premises for running a school amounted to "occupation" within Clause 9(3)(a).

Analysis: The term "occupation" was construed broadly and was not confined to personal residence. It was capable of including constructive occupation through the conduct of the school, especially where the landlord was an association rather than an individual. The premises were therefore required for bona fide occupation within the meaning of the Order.

Conclusion: Running a school could amount to occupation within Clause 9(3)(a).

Final Conclusion: The eviction order was within jurisdiction under the House Rent & Accommodation Control Order, and the petition seeking certiorari and prohibition failed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the governing control order permits eviction for the landlord's bona fide occupation, the term "occupation" may include constructive occupation for the intended user of the premises, and a separate permission governing conversion of use does not operate as a condition precedent unless the statute expressly so provides.

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