Foreign judgment and domicile principles determined succession: settled intention and fair hearing governed the English law outcome.

A foreign declaration on domicile may be impeached only for extrinsic fraud or a real denial of natural justice; on the facts, no fraud was shown and the hearing requirement was substantially satisfied, though the declaration could not bind the minors for want of international jurisdiction. Domicile of choice turns on settled intention gathered from conduct as a whole, not isolated declarations; the deceased was found domiciled in England, so succession to the movables and the English house proceeds was governed by English law under the law of situs. The wider partition under Travancore Ezhava law was therefore inconsistent to that extent.

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Issues: (i) whether the English declaration on domicile operated as res judicata or was impeachable on the grounds of fraud and breach of natural justice, including its effect on the minors; (ii) whether the deceased had acquired a domicile of choice in England so that succession to the movable assets and sale proceeds would be governed by English law.

Issue (i): whether the English declaration on domicile operated as res judicata or was impeachable on the grounds of fraud and breach of natural justice, including its effect on the minors.

Analysis: A foreign judgment can be impeached if it is obtained by fraud or if the proceedings are opposed to natural justice. Fraud sufficient to avoid a judgment must be extrinsic or collateral, and not merely a matter already tried and decided. On the facts, the administrators who obtained the declaration did not practise fraud, and there was no material to show that the English court was misled by knowingly false evidence. As regards the minors, service on their natural guardians afforded them an opportunity to contest the proceedings, and the requirement of fair hearing was substantially satisfied.

Conclusion: The declaration was not shown to be vitiated by fraud, and the objection based on natural justice failed; however, the declaration could not bind the minors as against want of jurisdiction in the international sense.

Issue (ii): whether the deceased had acquired a domicile of choice in England so that succession to the movable assets and sale proceeds would be governed by English law.

Analysis: Domicile depends on intention gathered from conduct, declarations, habits, and the whole course of life. The deceased's letters showed an earlier intention to return to India, but the later conduct, especially after he established practice and made a home in England, pointed to a settled intention to remain there. The declarations in favour of return were treated as interested statements not carried into effect by consistent conduct. The sale proceeds of the Sheffield house, being immovable property situated in England, were governed by the law of situs.

Conclusion: The deceased died domiciled in England, and succession to the movables and the English house proceeds was governed by English law.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded to the extent that the movable estate and the relevant sale proceeds were held to devolve under English law, limiting succession to the deceased's next of kin, and the broader partition under the Travancore Ezhava law was set aside insofar as it was inconsistent with that holding.

Ratio Decidendi: A foreign judgment may be disregarded only for extrinsic fraud or a real denial of fair hearing, and domicile is determined by the deceased's settled intention as evidenced by conduct rather than isolated declarations.

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