Restitution limitation begins when decree is varied, not when later appeal ends, under Article 181 principles.

Under Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908, limitation for restitution under Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure begins when the right to apply first accrues. That right arises as soon as the lower appellate court varies or reverses the trial court's decree, because the application lies to the court of first instance on that basis. A later appeal to the High Court does not postpone accrual of the right or extend limitation, and hardship or convenience cannot add a saving not found in the statute. The restitution applications were therefore treated as time-barred.

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Issues: Whether, for an application for restitution under Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, limitation under Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908 runs from the date of the lower appellate court's decree varying the trial court's decree or from the date of the High Court's later dismissal of the appeal.

Analysis: Article 181 is a residuary provision under which time begins when the applicant first has the right to make the application. A restitution application under Section 144 lies to the court of first instance because of the variation or reversal of the earlier decree, and the right to seek that relief arises as soon as the decree is varied or reversed by the lower appellate court. The subsequent appeal does not suspend that accrued right or postpone the starting point of limitation, and no additional saving can be imported on grounds of hardship or convenience.

Conclusion: Limitation began from the date of the lower appellate court's decrees, and the period occupied by the appeal to the High Court could not be excluded. The restitution applications were time-barred, and the appeals were allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: Under Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908, limitation for an application begins when the right to apply first accrues, and for restitution under Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 that right accrues on the decree being varied or reversed, not on its later affirmance in appeal.

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