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Issues: Whether the plaintiff's suit challenging dismissal from municipal service was barred by limitation, and whether the order of dismissal became operative only upon the disposal of the statutory appeal to the State Government.
Analysis: The relevant provisions required a suit against the Board to be brought within six months from accrual of the cause of action, with a prior two months' notice. The appellant's dismissal was passed by special resolution and communicated to him, and the statutory appeal to the State Government under the municipal law did not, by its terms, suspend the operation of the dismissal order or postpone its effectiveness. The power of the State Government to suspend pending appeal was held to be only an incidental appellate power for relief and not a condition precedent to the order becoming effective. The Court further held that the doctrine of merger applicable in some civil court contexts does not apply to departmental decisions so as to shift the starting point of limitation from the original dismissal order to the appellate decision.
Conclusion: The cause of action accrued when the dismissal resolution was communicated, limitation began from that date, and the suit was time-barred; the appeal therefore failed.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a statute grants an employee only a right of appeal against dismissal but does not expressly provide that the dismissal shall remain in abeyance pending appeal, the dismissal order becomes operative on communication and limitation for a civil challenge runs from that date, not from the appellate decision.