1966 (3) TMI 95 - HC - Indian Laws

Decree execution from 1938 allowed despite obstruction since 1941, debtor possession, Limitation Act applied

The court allowed the execution of a decree passed in 1938 to proceed, despite facing obstruction since 1941, due to possession of immovable properties by ... - Issues:1. Application for execution barred by limitation.2. Exclusion of time under Section 15 of the Limitation Act.3. Applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act.4. Interpretation of the term 'prescribed' in Section 15.5. Exclusion of period spent in prior execution proceedings under Section 14 and Section 15.Analysis:1. The case involved the execution of a decree passed in 1938 by the Sub Court of Arrah, which faced obstruction from judgment debtors since 1941. The decree-holder sought execution in the Madras High Court due to the possession of immovable properties by the debtors in Madras. The main objection raised was regarding the plea of limitation.2. The decree was initially for a sum of &8377; 18,540 and was transferred to the Civil Judge, Allahabad for execution. Various legal proceedings ensued, including the attachment and subsequent sale of a sugar mill, which was later set aside. The decree was eventually transferred to the Madras High Court for execution in 1956.3. The decree-holder claimed exclusion of the period of stay during execution proceedings under Section 15 of the Limitation Act. The objection raised by the respondents primarily focused on the inapplicability of Section 15 without providing specific reasons.4. The Master initially dismissed the execution application as time-barred, but on appeal, Venkatadri J. allowed the execution to proceed, citing entitlement to exclusion of time under both Section 14 and Section 15 of the Limitation Act. The court emphasized that the facts supported the invocation of Section 14.5. The court referred to a Full Bench decision stating that Section 48 of the Civil Procedure Code is controlled by Section 15 of the Limitation Act. It was held that the term 'prescribed' in Section 15 encompasses periods of limitation under general statutes like the Civil Procedure Code. The court found the materials provided by the decree-holder sufficient for the application of Section 15.6. The argument against the applicability of Section 14 was dismissed, emphasizing that the Full Bench decision applied to both Section 15 and Section 14. The court upheld the exclusion of the period spent in prior execution proceedings under both Section 14 and Section 15, without contest on the good faith of the decree-holder.7. The court dismissed the appeal, directing further inquiry by the Master as remanded by Venkatadri J., highlighting the importance of the issues raised and the costs involved. The decree-holder was entitled to the exclusion of time under Section 14 and Section 15, as per the judgment delivered.