Execution limitation excludes stay and prior infructuous proceedings, leaving the decree-holder's execution within time.

Limitation for execution under Section 48 CPC was held to attract exclusion under the Limitation Act where execution had been stayed or injuncted, because the restraint period was shown from the record and the limitation period fixed for execution was treated as a period of limitation for Section 15 purposes. The same approach was applied to earlier execution proceedings that had become infructuous, with no separate challenge to good faith or bona fides defeating exclusion under Section 14. On that basis, the decree-holder's execution was not time-barred, and the appeal failed.

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Issues: (i) Whether the period during which execution was stayed or injuncted was liable to be excluded under Section 15 of the Limitation Act in computing limitation for execution under Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; (ii) Whether the time spent in earlier execution proceedings, which became infructuous, was liable to be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act.

Issue (i): Whether the period during which execution was stayed or injuncted was liable to be excluded under Section 15 of the Limitation Act in computing limitation for execution under Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Analysis: The decree-holder produced sufficient material to show that execution had in fact been stayed and later revived. The objection that more particulars were necessary was rejected, as the available records established the existence and effect of the restraint on execution. The reasoning in the binding Full Bench decision treating the period fixed by Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as a period of limitation within the meaning of Section 15 was applied.

Conclusion: The decree-holder was entitled to exclusion of the stay period under Section 15 of the Limitation Act.

Issue (ii): Whether the time spent in earlier execution proceedings, which became infructuous, was liable to be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act.

Analysis: The same interpretative approach adopted for Section 15 was held applicable to Section 14, since both provisions used the same expression and the earlier proceedings had been prosecuted in a manner that attracted exclusion. No separate challenge to bona fides or good faith was pressed, and no other ground was shown to deny the benefit of Section 14.

Conclusion: The decree-holder was entitled to exclusion of the period spent in the earlier infructuous execution proceedings under Section 14 of the Limitation Act.

Final Conclusion: The decree-holder's execution was not barred by limitation, and the appeal failed.

Ratio Decidendi: The expression relating to a period of limitation under the Limitation Act extends to the limitation period fixed for execution under Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and time covered by an effective stay or prior infructuous execution proceedings is excluded in computing limitation.

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