Disability definition prevails over contrary State instructions, but age relaxation for recruitment remains discretionary without an implementing scheme.

The disability definition under the Disabilities Act prevailed over inconsistent State instructions, so a candidate with hearing disability falling within the statutory forty per cent threshold was recognised as a person with disability for recruitment purposes. However, Section 38 was treated as discretionary because it states that schemes for employment of persons with disabilities may provide age relaxation. In the absence of an implementing scheme or other enforceable rule, age relaxation was not mandatory and could not be claimed as of right. The ratio stated that the use of "may" in relation to recruitment relaxation is directory, not compulsory.

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Issues: (i) Whether the disability definition under the Disabilities Act entitled the appellant to be treated as a person with disability for recruitment purposes despite contrary State instructions; (ii) Whether Section 38 of the Disabilities Act made age relaxation for disabled candidates mandatory in the absence of an implementing scheme.

Issue (i): Whether the disability definition under the Disabilities Act entitled the appellant to be treated as a person with disability for recruitment purposes despite contrary State instructions.

Analysis: The disability threshold under Section 2(t) is not less than forty per cent disability, and that definition prevails over inconsistent State orders. The appellant's hearing disability satisfied that statutory definition, so the contrary State understanding could not deny him the status of a person with disability. However, that conclusion did not by itself confer an enforceable right to age relaxation.

Conclusion: The appellant was within the statutory definition of a person with disability, but that did not automatically entitle him to age relaxation.

Issue (ii): Whether Section 38 of the Disabilities Act made age relaxation for disabled candidates mandatory in the absence of an implementing scheme.

Analysis: Section 38 empowers the appropriate Government to formulate schemes for employment of persons with disabilities and states that such schemes may provide for relaxation of upper age limits. The use of the word "may" was treated as conferring discretion and not imposing a mandatory obligation. In the absence of any operative provision or scheme mandating age relaxation, the State's later recruitment guidelines remained effective, and the appellant could not claim relaxation as of right.

Conclusion: Age relaxation under Section 38 was held to be discretionary and not mandatory, so the appellant had no enforceable right to it.

Final Conclusion: The claim for appointment on the basis of age relaxation failed, and the dismissal of the appeal left the State recruitment regime undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a disability statute uses "may" in relation to age relaxation for recruitment, the provision is directory and does not create a mandatory entitlement absent an implementing scheme or other enforceable rule.

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