Executive tax arrest powers invalid where unguided discretion and missing constitutional safeguards for liberty made detention unlawful.

Executive arrest and imprisonment for income-tax recovery were treated as constitutionally defective because the recovery scheme gave the Collector an unguided choice between materially different procedures, including one without notice, hearing, or judicial scrutiny. That open-ended discretion was held arbitrary and discriminatory, offending Article 14. The arrest mechanism was also held inconsistent with Article 22(1) and 22(2) because it authorised detention by executive warrant without prior hearing, production before a Magistrate, or other judicial safeguards. The detention could not be sustained under the impugned recovery provisions, and release from custody followed.

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Issues: (i) Whether the arrest and imprisonment of an income-tax defaulter under Section 46(2) of the Income-tax Act, read with Section 48 of the Madras Revenue Recovery Act, was void for conferring an unfettered and discriminatory discretion on the Collector in breach of Article 14 of the Constitution; (ii) Whether Section 48 of the Madras Revenue Recovery Act, insofar as it authorised arrest and detention by executive warrant without hearing, production before a Magistrate, or judicial safeguards, was inconsistent with Article 22(1) and 22(2) of the Constitution and therefore void to that extent.

Issue (i): Whether the arrest and imprisonment of an income-tax defaulter under Section 46(2) of the Income-tax Act, read with Section 48 of the Madras Revenue Recovery Act, was void for conferring an unfettered and discriminatory discretion on the Collector in breach of Article 14 of the Constitution.

Analysis: The recovery scheme allowed the Collector to choose between two materially different modes of arrest and detention. One mode under the Revenue Recovery Act permitted executive arrest on the Collector's satisfaction without notice, hearing, or judicial scrutiny, while the other mode under the Civil Procedure Code required notice, proof of means, and other safeguards. No guiding principle, policy, or classification was laid down to regulate selection between the two procedures. The discretion was therefore not a controlled or guided discretion but an arbitrary power capable of unequal treatment of assessees placed in similar circumstances. Such an open-ended choice between harsher and milder procedures, without statutory standards, offended the constitutional guarantee of equality.

Conclusion: The impugned recovery mechanism was held to be inconsistent with Article 14 and invalid to that extent, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether Section 48 of the Madras Revenue Recovery Act, insofar as it authorised arrest and detention by executive warrant without hearing, production before a Magistrate, or judicial safeguards, was inconsistent with Article 22(1) and 22(2) of the Constitution and therefore void to that extent.

Analysis: Section 48 authorised arrest and imprisonment on an executive warrant issued by the Collector, with no provision for prior notice, opportunity to show cause, assistance of counsel, or production before a Magistrate within twenty-four hours. The detention contemplated was punitive in character and not a case of preventive detention. The Collector, acting under that section, was not a court and the warrant was not supported by the judicial process required by Article 22. The constitutional safeguards for personal liberty applied directly to such executive arrest, and the statutory procedure was plainly inconsistent with them.

Conclusion: Section 48 was held void to the extent it authorised arrest and detention contrary to Article 22(1) and 22(2), in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The detention of the petitioner could not be sustained under the impugned recovery provisions, and the petition was allowed with consequential release from custody.

Ratio Decidendi: A statute authorising executive arrest and imprisonment for tax recovery is invalid where it confers unguided discretion to choose between discriminatory procedures and omits the constitutional safeguards of hearing and judicial supervision required for deprivation of personal liberty.

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