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Issues: (i) Whether the lands in dispute remained vested in the plaintiff's family despite the resumption and regrant of the village, or whether the occupancy rights had been validly resumed; (ii) whether the suit was within limitation by reason of exclusion of the period spent in obtaining permission to sue and by reason of the defendant's absence from British India.
Issue (i): Whether the lands in dispute remained vested in the plaintiff's family despite the resumption and regrant of the village, or whether the occupancy rights had been validly resumed.
Analysis: The original grant was treated as a Saranjam grant of revenue, and the later grant to the plaintiff's ancestor was a grant of the village on terms that did not bind successors beyond the grantor's authority. The Court held that the later grant of the soil could not defeat the superior rights of the Saranjamdar's successor where the grant was rent-free, conferred no benefit on the estate, and was not shown to have been intended as a binding alienation. The evidence of governmental and State action after the death of Raghunathrao, including the change in revenue entries, the regrant, the agreement with the widow, and the subsequent taking of possession, supported a conclusion that the grant had been resumed, at least in substance, before the plaintiff acquired title by adoption.
Conclusion: The occupancy rights had been validly resumed and the plaintiff acquired no title to the lands in dispute.
Issue (ii): Whether the suit was within limitation by reason of exclusion of the period spent in obtaining permission to sue and by reason of the defendant's absence from British India.
Analysis: The Court held that there was no statutory basis for excluding the time taken to obtain permission under Section 86 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The general maxim that the law does not compel impossibilities could not override the express bar of limitation. The Court further held that Section 13 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 could not be construed so as to make suits against a Sovereign Prince or Ruling Chief practically unlimited merely because he ordinarily resided outside British India; such a defendant was treated, for purposes of the suit, as acting through representatives in British India, and the absence provision therefore did not apply.
Conclusion: The suit was barred by limitation.
Final Conclusion: The plaintiff was held to have no enforceable title and the action was out of time, so the decree of the trial court could not stand.
Ratio Decidendi: A rent-free alienation of Saranjam property that confers no benefit on the estate is not binding on the Saranjamdar's successor unless clearly supported by authority, and the absence-based exclusion in limitation law cannot be construed so as to eliminate limitation altogether in suits against a Sovereign Prince or Ruling Chief who acts through representatives in British India.