1928 (7) TMI 2 - HC - Indian Laws

High Court rules against Plaintiff on land ownership, grant resumption, and suit time-barred

The High Court dismissed the Plaintiff's suit, ruling against the Plaintiff on ownership of the lands, validity of the grant resumption by the Gaikwar, ... - Issues Involved:1. Ownership of the lands in suit.2. Validity of resumption of grant by the Gaikwar.3. Applicability of the Indian Limitation Act and Section 86 of the Code of Civil Procedure.4. Whether the suit is time-barred.5. Validity of the Plaintiff's adoption.Detailed Analysis:1. Ownership of the Lands in Suit:The Plaintiff claimed ownership of the lands as the adopted son of Raghunathrao. The original grant in 1728 by Shahu Maharaj to the Gaikwar was a grant of the royal share of the revenue, not the soil. The Gaikwar's family enjoyed the lands from 1834 to 1854. In 1862, Khanderao Gaikwar granted the village to Limbaji, the Plaintiff's ancestor, which included mirasi rights (rights of permanent tenants). The Subordinate Judge found that the Plaintiff's family acquired these rights by the 1862 grant. However, the High Court held that the grant to Limbaji was resumable and not binding on the successors of the Gaikwar. Thus, the Plaintiff's title to the lands was not upheld.2. Validity of Resumption of Grant by the Gaikwar:The Gaikwar resumed the grant after Madhavrao's death, and the Bombay Government regranted the village to the Gaikwar in 1904. The High Court found that the resumption of the grant was valid and binding. The Plaintiff argued there was no formal order of resumption, but the High Court held that the evidence showed the Gaikwar's consistent action to resume the grant, including the removal of Chandrabai's name from the records and entering the Gaikwar's name instead.3. Applicability of the Indian Limitation Act and Section 86 of the Code of Civil Procedure:The Plaintiff sought to exclude the period from July 25, 1916, to November 15, 1920, spent obtaining permission to sue the Gaikwar under Section 86 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The High Court held that there was no provision in the Indian Limitation Act to allow such an exclusion. The principle 'lex non cogit ad impossibilia' (the law does not compel the impossible) was not applicable as the Plaintiff could have applied for permission earlier and brought the suit within the limitation period.4. Whether the Suit is Time-Barred:The Plaintiff's suit was filed in 1922, claiming dispossession in 1910. The High Court found that dispossession occurred in 1906-1907, making the suit time-barred under Article 142 of the Indian Limitation Act, which prescribes a 12-year limitation period for suits for possession based on dispossession. The High Court rejected the Plaintiff's claim to exclude the period spent obtaining permission under Section 86 of the Code of Civil Procedure.5. Validity of the Plaintiff's Adoption:The trial court found that the Plaintiff was the validly adopted son of Raghunathrao. This point was not disputed in the appeal, and the High Court did not address it further.Conclusion:The High Court reversed the Subordinate Judge's decree and dismissed the Plaintiff's suit with costs, holding that the Plaintiff's claim to the lands was not upheld, the resumption of the grant by the Gaikwar was valid, the suit was time-barred, and the Plaintiff was not entitled to exclude the period spent obtaining permission under Section 86 of the Code of Civil Procedure.