Stridhan remains the wife's separate property; dishonest retention can support criminal breach of trust despite civil remedies.

The doctrine of stridhan survives the Hindu Marriage Act and the Hindu Succession Act, and marriage gifts intended for the wife's separate use remain her exclusive property. Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act provides a civil remedy in matrimonial proceedings, but it does not exclude a complaint where such property is retained or converted by others. A complaint alleging entrustment of ornaments and refusal to return them discloses a prima facie offence of criminal breach of trust under Section 406 IPC, and civil remedies do not bar criminal proceedings at the quashing stage.

---

---

Issues: (i) Whether the concept of stridhan stood abolished or merged into joint property by the Hindu Marriage Act and the Hindu Succession Act so as to preclude criminal liability for retention of the wife's ornaments and articles. (ii) Whether the complaint disclosed an offence under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and was liable to be quashed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Issue (i): Whether the concept of stridhan stood abolished or merged into joint property by the Hindu Marriage Act and the Hindu Succession Act so as to preclude criminal liability for retention of the wife's ornaments and articles.

Analysis: The statutory scheme did not expressly or impliedly abrogate stridhan. Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 provides a civil remedy concerning jointly owned property in matrimonial proceedings, but it does not take away a wife's right to complain when her exclusive property is misappropriated. Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 enlarges ownership in property possessed by a female, but does not destroy the traditional incidents of stridhan. Presents of ornaments and similar articles made to the bride at marriage, where intended for her use, continue to retain their character as her separate property.

Conclusion: The doctrine of stridhan survives, and its misappropriation can attract criminal liability.

Issue (ii): Whether the complaint disclosed an offence under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and was liable to be quashed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Analysis: The complaint contained specific allegations that the ornaments and other articles belonging to the respondent were entrusted to the petitioners for safe custody and were later refused or converted to their own use. At the stage of quashing, the Court was required to accept the factual allegations as made and not to decide their proof. The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 defined dowry for its own limited purpose and did not negate the pre-existing legal character of marriage gifts as stridhan. The complaint therefore disclosed sufficient facts to call for trial, and a civil remedy did not bar criminal proceedings where criminal breach of trust was alleged.

Conclusion: The complaint disclosed a prima facie case under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and was not liable to be quashed.

Final Conclusion: The petition to quash the complaint and summoning order failed, and the prosecution was permitted to proceed.

Ratio Decidendi: Marriage gifts intended for the wife's separate use retain the character of stridhan, and their dishonest retention or conversion by persons in custody of such property may constitute criminal breach of trust notwithstanding the availability of matrimonial civil remedies.

---