Condonation of delay under a special limitation regime applies where the Limitation Act is not expressly excluded.

Where a special statute prescribes its own limitation period for appeal and does not expressly exclude the Limitation Act, Section 29(2) imports Sections 3 to 24, including Section 5, so delay may be condoned on sufficient cause even before a statutory appellate authority. The analysis notes that the authority's non-court status does not prevent application of Section 5. It also stresses that bona fide prosecution of earlier proceedings, including time spent before the High Court before pursuing the alternative appellate remedy, must be considered in deciding condonation. On that basis, the delay was treated as liable to condonation and the appeal as fit to be restored for decision on merits.

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Issues: Whether delay in filing an appeal under Section 27(5) of the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1963 could be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 by virtue of Section 29(2) of that Act, and whether the appellate authority was justified in rejecting the appeal as time-barred instead of deciding it on merits.

Analysis: Section 27(5) of the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1963 prescribed a special period of limitation for the appeal. Once a special law prescribes a different limitation period, Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies and imports the machinery of Sections 3 to 24 of that Act unless expressly excluded. The result is that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 becomes available even before a statutory appellate authority functioning under the special law, and the fact that the authority is not a court in the strict sense does not defeat that consequence. The petitioner had been diligently prosecuting the challenge, first before the High Court and then before the appellate authority after withdrawal of the writ petition to pursue the alternative remedy. In these circumstances, the delay ought to have been considered with reference to the surrounding facts and the period spent in bona fide pursuit of the earlier proceeding.

Conclusion: The delay in filing the appeal was liable to be condoned, and the appellate authority erred in dismissing the appeal as barred by limitation.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order was quashed, and the appeal was restored for decision on merits after condonation of delay.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a special statute prescribes its own limitation period and does not exclude the Limitation Act, Section 29(2) imports Section 5 so that delay may be condoned for sufficient cause even before a statutory appellate authority.

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