Equal pay for equal work barred a discriminatory tribunal pay scale and invalidated reductions applied to existing members.
A pay distinction between members of a common appellate tribunal, based only on the enactment under which they were appointed, was held to be an unreasonable classification because all members performed identical work, duties and responsibilities; the higher pay scale was therefore applicable from the date of appointment. Notifications seeking to reduce that higher scale and equalise it with the lower scale could not validly be applied to existing incumbents, because service conditions already accrued to them could not be worsened by removing that entitlement. The impugned amendments were struck down to that extent, with consequential monetary benefits and interest.
Issues: (i) whether a member of a common appellate tribunal, appointed under one enactment, was entitled to the same pay scale as members appointed under the other enactment when all members discharged identical functions and responsibilities; (ii) whether the notifications reducing the higher pay scale and equalising it with the lower scale could validly be applied to existing members already appointed to the post.
Issue (i): whether a member of a common appellate tribunal, appointed under one enactment, was entitled to the same pay scale as members appointed under the other enactment when all members discharged identical functions and responsibilities.
Analysis: The members of the tribunal, irrespective of the enactment to which their appointment traced back, formed part of one common tribunal and were required to hear appeals under both enactments. Their status, nature of work, responsibilities and quantum of duties were identical. A classification based only on the source enactment of appointment had no rational nexus with the work performed. The principle of equal pay for equal work, read with the equality guarantees, applied where employees holding identical posts and performing identical duties were treated differently without a reasonable basis.
Conclusion: The petitioner was entitled, from the date of his appointment, to the same higher pay scale as members appointed under the other enactment, and the lower scale was discriminatory.
Issue (ii): whether the notifications reducing the higher pay scale and equalising it with the lower scale could validly be applied to existing members already appointed to the post.
Analysis: Once the petitioner was entitled to the higher scale from the date of appointment, the respondent could not alter the terms of service to his detriment by reducing the admissible pay scale. An amendment that removes pre-existing discrimination cannot do so by withdrawing an already accrued higher entitlement of an existing incumbent and thereby worsening service conditions. Such a change was arbitrary and unjustified in law.
Conclusion: The impugned notifications were invalid to the extent they lowered the pay scale of existing members and could not be sustained against the petitioner.
Final Conclusion: The petition succeeded, the impugned amendments were struck down, and the petitioner was held entitled to the higher pay scale with consequential monetary benefits and interest.
Ratio Decidendi: Where employees hold identical posts in a common tribunal and perform identical duties and responsibilities, a pay distinction based solely on the source enactment of appointment is an unreasonable classification and violates the equality principle; service conditions of existing incumbents cannot be reduced to their detriment by such an amendment.
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