Just a moment...
Press 'Enter' to add multiple search terms. Rules for Better Search
Use comma for multiple locations.
---------------- For section wise search only -----------------
Accuracy Level ~ 90%
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
No Folders have been created
Are you sure you want to delete "My most important" ?
NOTE:
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Don't have an account? Register Here
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Issues: Whether the High Court could interfere under Articles 227 and 228 of the Constitution of India with the levy of damages under Section 14B of the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952, where the employer's remittances were delayed by a few days and the power to impose damages was discretionary.
Analysis: The employer was statutorily bound under the Scheme to deduct and remit contributions together with the administrative charge by the 15th of every month. The delayed remittances were not treated as immaterial, but the power under Section 14B was discretionary and had to be exercised reasonably. The long delay in initiating action, after repeated defaults of only a few days and without earlier objection, supported the inference that the authority had not acted promptly or fairly. Since the purpose of Section 14B was not merely punitive but also reformative, imposing damages after many years for old defaults was held to be harsh and arbitrary.
Conclusion: The levy of damages was quashed as being beyond proper exercise of the discretionary power vested in the authority, and the petition was allowed in favour of the petitioner.
Final Conclusion: Delayed remittance alone did not justify a belated and arbitrary imposition of damages where the statutory discretion under Section 14B had to be exercised fairly and with reference to the object of the Scheme.
Ratio Decidendi: A discretionary power to impose damages for default in provident fund remittance must be exercised reasonably and not arbitrarily or after inordinate delay, especially where the statute's object is both reformative and punitive.