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Issues: (i) Whether the High Court had jurisdiction under Article 226 to issue a protective writ or order against an executive authority enforcing an administrative externment order. (ii) Whether Section 2(1)(b) of the Bombay Public Security Measures Act, 1947, in so far as it authorised externment without hearing, grounds, or temporal safeguards, imposed an unreasonable restriction on the rights guaranteed by Article 19(1)(d) and (e) and was therefore void under Article 13(1).
Issue (i): Whether the High Court had jurisdiction under Article 226 to issue a protective writ or order against an executive authority enforcing an administrative externment order.
Analysis: Article 226 was treated as conferring wide power on the High Court to issue directions, orders, and writs not merely in the nature of the traditional prerogative writs but also for enforcement of fundamental rights and for other purposes. The earlier territorial and procedural limits governing certiorari, mandamus, and related remedies did not confine the constitutional power. The existence of an administrative order did not by itself oust jurisdiction where protection of a fundamental right was sought.
Conclusion: The High Court had jurisdiction to grant relief against enforcement of the externment order.
Issue (ii): Whether Section 2(1)(b) of the Bombay Public Security Measures Act, 1947, in so far as it authorised externment without hearing, grounds, or temporal safeguards, imposed an unreasonable restriction on the rights guaranteed by Article 19(1)(d) and (e) and was therefore void under Article 13(1).
Analysis: The majority held that restrictions under Article 19(5) must be reasonable in substance and judged by their nature, extent, manner of imposition, and effect on the guaranteed rights. Although the expression "interests of the general public" was wide, the externment scheme was found defective because the affected person had no right to be heard, no obligation existed to communicate grounds, and the statute supplied no effective safeguard against arbitrary deprivation of freedom of movement and residence. These features rendered the restriction unreasonable in the constitutional sense.
Conclusion: Section 2(1)(b) was unconstitutional to the extent it authorised such externment and the petitioner was entitled to relief.
Dissenting Opinion: Shah J. held that the validity of the restriction had to be judged by the reasonableness of the restriction itself, not by the procedural safeguards or possible abuse in its implementation. In his view, the absence of a hearing requirement or other safeguards did not make the provision unconstitutional.
Final Conclusion: The externment order could not be enforced against the petitioner, and the Court protected the petitioner's freedom of movement and residence under the Constitution.
Ratio Decidendi: A law authorising restriction on the fundamental rights of movement and residence must impose a restriction that is reasonable in substance and in the constitutional setting; where the scheme permits externment without hearing or disclosure of grounds and thereby leaves the right exposed to arbitrary deprivation, the restriction is unreasonable and void to that extent.