Consent decree and compromise validity: appeal barred, and compromise recorded through authorised counsel upheld.

An appeal against a consent decree is barred where the decree was passed with the consent of parties, and the proper remedy for challenging the compromise lies before the court that recorded it. A compromise recorded in writing and signed through duly authorized counsel satisfies Order 23 Rule 3, including where the agreement promises future vacation of premises and creates an executable decree. The court treated counsel acting under vakalatnama as competent to bind the party for compromise. The consent decree was therefore upheld as lawful, and the respondents remained entitled to pursue mesne profits until delivery of possession in accordance with law.

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Issues: (i) Whether an appeal under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 against a consent decree was maintainable; (ii) Whether the compromise recorded on 23.5.2001, resulting in the decree dated 18.7.2001, was a valid compromise under Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Issue (i): Whether an appeal under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 against a consent decree was maintainable.

Analysis: Section 96(3) bars an appeal from a decree passed with the consent of parties. After the 1976 amendments, an order recording or refusing to record compromise is not separately appealable, and Rule 3A bars a separate suit to impeach a compromise decree. The proper remedy is before the court that recorded the compromise. Since the decree in question was a consent decree, the appellate court had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.

Conclusion: The appeal before the appellate court was not maintainable.

Issue (ii): Whether the compromise recorded on 23.5.2001, resulting in the decree dated 18.7.2001, was a valid compromise under Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Analysis: Order 23 Rule 3 contains two distinct situations: a lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties, and satisfaction of the plaintiff by the defendant. A promise to vacate the premises on a future date falls within the first part, because it creates an executable decree and is not a completed satisfaction already performed. The statements of counsel were recorded by the court, signed, and were made by a counsel duly authorized through vakalatnama. Counsel can validly act on behalf of a party for compromise where properly authorized. The compromise was therefore in writing and signed through authorized counsel, and the decree was also supportable as one passed on admission.

Conclusion: The compromise was valid and the consent decree was lawful.

Final Conclusion: The consent decree was upheld and the appeal failed; the respondents remained entitled to pursue mesne profits from 22.1.2002 until delivery of possession in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: A consent decree based on a compromise recorded by the court through duly authorized counsel, and supported by signed statements in writing, is valid under Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, while an appeal against such a consent decree is barred by section 96(3).

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