Service of arbitral award on counsel alone does not start limitation; actual delivery to the party is required.

Delivery of a signed arbitral award under Section 31(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 must be made to the party itself, not merely to its advocate or agent. The term "party" in Section 2(h) refers to the party to the arbitration agreement, and counsel's authority under a vakalatnama does not displace the statute's requirement of personal delivery. Limitation for an application under Section 34(3) begins only when the party actually receives the signed award. Earlier decisions under the Arbitration Act, 1940 were distinguished because that regime lacked an equivalent provision. On this reasoning, service on counsel alone was insufficient and the challenge was treated as timely.

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Issues: Whether service of a signed copy of the arbitral award on the party's advocate or agent amounts to service on the party for the purposes of Section 31(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and triggers limitation under Section 34(3) of that Act.

Analysis: The expression "party" in Section 2(h) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 refers to the party to the arbitration agreement and does not include the advocate or agent merely by reason of a vakalatnama. Section 31(5) requires delivery of a signed copy of the award to the party himself so that limitation for filing an application under Section 34(3) begins only upon such delivery. The authority of counsel to act in the proceedings does not extend to substituting service on the party where the statute specifically requires delivery to the party. Decisions under the Arbitration Act, 1940 were held inapplicable because that regime did not contain an equivalent provision.

Conclusion: Service of the signed arbitral award on the respondent's counsel did not amount to service on the respondent itself. The limitation period under Section 34(3) began when the respondent actually received the signed award, and the Section 34 petition was within time.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the Division Bench's view failed, and the award-setting-aside petition was held to be timely because statutory delivery had not been effected merely by service on counsel.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statute requires delivery of a signed arbitral award to the party, service on the party's advocate or agent is insufficient unless the party itself receives the award; limitation runs from actual delivery to the party.

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