Amended pleadings and retroactive tenancy law: appellate fact-finding is impermissible, and pending appeals remain maintainable.

Amendment of pleadings in a pending Letters Patent appeal that introduces a new statutory defence and fresh disputed facts requires trial-level evidence; the High Court cannot itself act as a court of first instance and record findings on issues not previously tried, and consent cannot confer such jurisdiction. The retroactive operation of section 13(3A) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 was upheld as constitutionally valid and applicable to pending proceedings. Section 17E was treated as an additional remedy and not the exclusive bar to a tenant's challenge to an eviction decree in a pending appeal.

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Issues: (i) Whether, after amendment of pleadings in a pending Letters Patent appeal, the High Court could itself record evidence and determine new disputed questions of fact or should remand the matter; (ii) Whether the retroactive operation of section 13(3A) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 was valid and applicable to the pending proceedings; (iii) Whether the tenant's failure to obtain relief under section 17E barred the challenge to the eviction decree.

Issue (i): Whether, after amendment of pleadings in a pending Letters Patent appeal, the High Court could itself record evidence and determine new disputed questions of fact or should remand the matter.

Analysis: Once the pleadings were amended to introduce a new statutory defence and fresh factual controversy, the matter required trial-level appreciation of oral and documentary evidence. The appellate court's power did not extend to functioning as a trial court and recording findings on issues not previously tried, particularly where the controversy was raised for the first time because of the amendment. The limitations governing second appeals also indicated that such fact-finding could not be undertaken by the High Court in appeal. Consent of the parties could not cure the absence of inherent jurisdiction to undertake that exercise. The proper course was to remand the matter so that evidence could be recorded and findings returned by the appropriate court hierarchy.

Conclusion: The High Court should not have itself tried the newly opened factual issues; remand was required, and the appellant succeeded on this point.

Issue (ii): Whether the retroactive operation of section 13(3A) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 was valid and applicable to the pending proceedings.

Analysis: The retroactive application of section 13(3A) had already been upheld. The provision did not offend Article 19(1)(f) read with Article 19(5) of the Constitution of India. The pending appeal was therefore governed by the amended statutory scheme, including the bar against suits by transferee landlords within the prescribed period. The consequence of the amendment was that the landlord's suit had to be tested on the footing of the new statutory restriction.

Conclusion: The retroactive operation of section 13(3A) was valid and bound the pending proceedings.

Issue (iii): Whether the tenant's failure to obtain relief under section 17E barred the challenge to the eviction decree.

Analysis: Section 17E afforded an additional remedy for tenants against whom eviction decrees had been passed in cases covered by section 13(3A), especially where no appeal was pending. Its availability did not extinguish a tenant's right to challenge an existing decree in a pending appeal. Treating section 17E as the exclusive route would defeat the statutory scheme and render the pending appeal ineffective.

Conclusion: The pending appeal was not barred by the tenant's unsuccessful recourse to section 17E.

Final Conclusion: The eviction decree was set aside and the suit was sent back for further proceedings from the stage reached after amendment of the pleadings, with the amended issues to be tried afresh.

Ratio Decidendi: When amended pleadings in appeal introduce new disputed questions of fact, the appellate court cannot itself assume the role of trial court to record and appraise evidence on those issues, and consent of parties cannot confer such jurisdiction.

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