Court rules on jurisdiction, withdrawal, and limitation in suit appeal.

The suit was not barred by limitation as it was filed within the prescribed time frame. The Court determined that the suit's jurisdiction should be based on its value at the time of institution and subsequent events could not affect it. The 2nd Plaintiff's attempt to withdraw from the suit without the 1st Plaintiff's consent was not permitted. The Court allowed the appeal, remanding the suit for further proceedings, except for one issue. The Appellant was entitled to a refund of the court-fee paid on the appeal.

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Issues Involved:
1. Whether the suit was barred by limitation.
2. Whether the 1st Plaintiff's claim was within the jurisdiction of the Court.
3. The effect of subsequent events on the continuation of the suit.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Whether the suit was barred by limitation:

The suit was filed on 9th April 1947, more than twelve years after the death of the last limited owner on 1st May 1934. The Plaintiffs contended that the suit was not barred by limitation under Sections 6, 7, and 8 of the Limitation Act, as the second Plaintiff, Rangaswami Reddi, was born on 19th December 1926, and the third Plaintiff, Muthuswami Reddi was born on 7th April 1931, and both were minors when the reversionary right opened to them in May 1934. The Court noted that the question of whether a suit is barred by limitation should be decided based on the facts as they stood on the date of the presentation of the plaint. The Court observed that the suit as framed was not barred by limitation, as it was filed by both the transferor and the transferee, and the benefit of the decision in the suit would go to the transferee.

2. Whether the 1st Plaintiff's claim was within the jurisdiction of the Court:

The learned Subordinate Judge held in favor of the 1st Plaintiff on this issue, stating that the proper forum would be the Court which could entertain the claim on the date of the institution of the suit, and subsequent events would not oust its jurisdiction. The 1st Defendant had filed an application arguing that the value of the relief asked for by the Plaintiff would stand automatically cut down due to the withdrawal of the 3rd Plaintiff's claim for past mesne profits, potentially affecting the jurisdiction. However, the Court maintained that jurisdiction should be determined by the value of the suit at the time of its institution, and subsequent events could not divest the Court of its jurisdiction.

3. The effect of subsequent events on the continuation of the suit:

The 3rd Plaintiff, Muthuswami Reddi, became a major on 7th April 1949 and executed a deed of relinquishment in favor of the 1st Defendant, stating that the sale deed executed by his elder brother to Thayammal was nominal and not binding on him. He filed an application to strike out his name as a co-Plaintiff, and the Court transposed him as a Defendant. Subsequently, the 2nd Plaintiff filed multiple applications, including one to continue the suit alone and another to withdraw from the suit. The Court permitted the 2nd Plaintiff to withdraw his claim, but the 1st Plaintiff did not consent to his complete withdrawal from the suit. The Court held that under Order XXIII, Rule 1(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court is not authorized to permit one of several Plaintiffs to withdraw without the consent of the others. Therefore, the 2nd Plaintiff could not altogether withdraw from the suit without the 1st Plaintiff's consent. The Court concluded that it must be taken as if the 2nd Plaintiff is still on record for the prayer in paragraph 14(a) of the plaint.

The Court disagreed with the learned Judge's finding that it was no longer open to the 1st Plaintiff to continue the action, stating that the 2nd Plaintiff's withdrawal did not affect the 1st Plaintiff's right to continue the suit. The appeal was allowed, and the suit was remanded to the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Coimbatore for disposal of the other issues, except issue 10, which was not challenged before the High Court. No order as to costs in the appeal was made, and the Appellant was entitled to a refund of the court-fee paid on the memorandum of appeal.

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